

AN
ESSAY
CONCERNING
RATIONAL NOTIONS.

To which is added,
The Proof of a God.



L O N D O N:
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PREFACE



I shall need no other apology for offering this performance to the publick, but that the design of it will sufficiently justify and recommend any error or attempt that is but reasonable on the

T H E

P R E F A C E.

I Shall use no other apology for offering this performance to the publick, but that the design of it will sufficiently justify and recommend any essay or attempt, that is but tolerable, on the subject.

For rational notions, of
which I propose to treat, do

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set forth wherein the agreement or disagreement of any thing to our reason, doth consist; or shew, in what respects, and upon what accounts things are to be deemed reasonable, or otherwise: which in effect, is displaying the whole exercise of reason, or exhibiting all the uses for which it serves; whatever properly falls under its notice and cognisance, being either agreeable or repugnant to it, and, as such only, subject to its judgment and determination. Now the knowledge, acquired by these notions, is undoubtedly the most
excellent

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excellent imaginable; there being nothing truly valuable, or worthy of our esteem and approbation, whether a matter of speculation or practice, but what agrees with reason, and only because agreeable to it. Nor can there be a more delightful entertainment, than to survey and contemplate the several uses and powers of a faculty which is so vastly superior to any other, and carries in it a resemblance of what is divine.

The constant, familiar, and indispensable use of rational

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notions, in all our thoughts and reflections of what kind soever, is so clear and incontestable a proof of their truth and reality, that there can be no need to quote any authorities, tho' from the best and most approved writers, to support or confirm them. The single Authority of Mr. *Locke* might serve instead of a thousand, were there occasion for any; who in his elaborate treatise on the understanding, the principal design whereof is to explain the mind's notions of all sorts; tho' he takes no notice of rational notions, yet

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yet uses them continually throughout his whole work; but which was indeed unavoidable, because otherwise it was impossible to have made himself understood in any thing he says. And by the omission of them, (as I may here take leave to observe) he has not only given a partial and imperfect account of his subject, but made an unjust and unfair representation of it. For it is much the same thing as if a biographer, in writing the history of some illustrious person, should only recite such of his actions and qualities, as

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are ordinary and to be found among the vulgar: or as if a philosopher, in treating of the nature of an animal, should content himself with an anatomical description of its parts, without saying any thing of its life, sense and spontaneous motion.



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A Query.

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E S S A Y

CONCERNING

Rational Notions.

C H A P. I.

Of Rational Notions in general.

THAT there are things *agree-*
able or conformable to our
reason, and likewise disagree-
able or contrary and repugnant to it,
(usually expressed by the words, right
and wrong, well and amiss, what
B ought

ought and ought not to be, with others of a like importance) and which accordingly, as rational beings, that is, by the use of our reason or faculty of judging, we either approve or disapprove, like or dislike, allow or reject; is as certain and undeniable, as that some objects are pleasing and grateful, others displeasing and offensive to our senses. No one can make any doubt or question of this, who ever reflects on his own thoughts and sentiments of things, or has any deference and regard for the judgment and opinion of the rest of mankind.



The discernment, conception, or apprehension of what is either agreeable or repugnant to reason, in any case or instance whatsoever, is in general what we here mean, and is
com-

commonly understood by a *rational notion*.

To prevent any mistake about this sort of notions, (which for distinction, and by way of eminence, are called *rational*) or the confounding of others with them, it will not be amiss to observe; that there are some *notions* which every one acquires in the earliest use of his understanding, as v. gr. *being, existence, unity, number, sameness, diversity, whole, part*; and the like common and ordinary apprehensions of things, which arise in our minds *immediately*, upon viewing and taking notice of objects with any degree of attention. They are attained without study or meditation; for 'tis certain that children, who cannot be supposed to meditate, or set them-

4 RATIONAL NOTIONS

selves to consider and reflect, have them so soon as they begin to learn the names of things; it being impossible they should give the same name to a thing constantly, with an intention to signify it to be such a thing, and no other, as we find they do, without conceiving or apprehending, (however perhaps somewhat obscurely and imperfectly) that the thing signified hath a being of its own distinct from other things, and that it exists or actually is, and that it is one thing only.

And there are other *notions* of a later date, which require *reflection*, or consideration and a previous examination of the things they concern, before they can gain admittance into the mind; as, v. gr. the *requisite-ness* of one thing to the being and existence

existence of another ; *perfection* of any kind ; *truth*, or that which, so soon as understood, authorizes and commands our assent to it ; with divers others needless here to be mentioned.

Such notions alone, as proceed from or enter into the mind by *reflection*, are to be accounted *rational*. For it is plainly impossible to discern or apprehend the rightness or wrongness, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any thing, without first *reflecting*, or previously examining and considering it. Nor does the mind ever examine and consider any thing, but in order to see whether or no it be reasonable, or such as reason requires it should be.

Rational or *reflex* notions (to give a general character or brief and summary description of them) are the mind's second or *after-thoughts*, whereby it acquires a more perfect and mature knowledge of things, and a deeper insight into their natures, than by those notions which occur to it immediately upon its first observing and taking notice of objects : And it is by them only, that the mind ever does or can attain that sort of knowledge which is truly satisfactory to it, or wherein the thorough discernment and right apprehension or understanding of a thing doth consist : and they are withal so very comprehensive as to be applicable to every thing ; or there is no object whatever of thought but affords matter and occasion for the continual exercise

exercise and employment of some or other of them.

As to the number of these notions; there must be so many of them, as there are sorts of agreement and disagreement of things to reason. I say, *sorts*; for the objects of reason, or the particular things which are either agreeable or repugnant to it, being innumerable, there is therefore no other way of propounding or making them known to advantage and satisfaction, but by reducing them under general heads, or sorts and kinds, from which every thing that is reasonable or otherwise may take its denomination, and be understood to have that nature and quality which it hath: and which of course, when thus considered by the mind, are so many several and distinct rational notions.

8 RATIONAL NOTIONS, &c.

Those among them of the most general use and concernment, (and therefore fittest to be spoken of before the rest) are, I conceive, *Requisiteness*, *Properness*, *Fitness*, *Dueness*, and *Suitableness*. The way I shall take to explain them, (and as any one will easily see, they scarce admit of any other explication) is chiefly by examples, or by exhibiting the several cases and instances wherein they may be applied; I mean the most material and important, for to enumerate them all would be an endless labour. And from which will sufficiently and plainly enough appear, their great usefulness as well as extent; and the necessity there is of employing them in our rational thoughts and considerations of any kind whatsoever.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Of Requisiteuess.

WHEN a thing does not subsist by itself, or hath not a power and virtue of its own whereby it exists, and is that which it is, our reason tells us that it requires or stands in need of something else to enable it to exist, and have that sort of being and nature which it hath: which is as much as to say, there is some other thing *requisite* to its being and existence. For instance, the sensible qualities of bodies, as solidity, extension, figure, motion, &c. and the faculties of the soul, as sense, understanding, memory, &c. not having a power of their own of existing and being what they are, something else is needful
and

TO REQUISITENESS.

and requisite to their being and existence.

And from this consideration in all probability did first arise the thought or notion of *substance*, i. e. that which subsists by itself, or merely by its own proper and inherent virtue, it being plainly impossible that any thing which does not subsist in that manner, shou^d any otherwise exist or be that which it is, than by means of something which does.

Substance therefore is the general *requisite* of all other things, because they must necessarily depend on it for their existence and being what they are.

And since nothing can act after any way or manner, that is, at all, without

without having a power or ability to act as it does, *power* therefore is requisite to *action*.

And *cause* to *effect*; for every effect owes its existence to the cause which produced it, and otherwise could never have been.

Wherefore *means* and *instruments*, as having the nature of causes, are requisite; for tho' employed and made use of by the agent or first cause, yet they effect or bring about that, by his conduct and direction, which he could not perform immediately or by himself, and so are properly enough called subordinate and secondary causes.

And in every work or performance, which remains after the operation is over,

over, *materials* are requisite; as, v. gr. stone, mortar, wood, &c. which are the materials of a house, or to build withal.

And *qualification*, as being a sort of power, is requisite in several cases; as skill in the laws is a requisite qualification in a judge, or one who is to execute justice and determine right; and courage in a soldier, that he may behave himself in battle as he ought.

And that which is necessarily *implied* by any act or operation, is requisite to it, tho' it do not in the least concern or affect the power itself; as an object is requisite to the act of perceiving, and ground or *terra firma* to walking.

Also

Also whatever *constitutes*, or *serves* to constitute the being of a thing, is requisite to it. Thus, in every sort of being there is an essence required, to make it that which it is. And the animal nature, and likewise reason and understanding, are both of them requisite to the being of man, because it is constituted by them.

And for the same reason, the several *parts* of which a thing consists, are requisite to it considered as *a whole*, because they *constitute* its wholeness or entireness.

And the *foundation*, as it is called, or ground and cause of relation, is requisite to things being related to one another; as the matrimonial contract, to the relations of husband and wife;

wife; and generation or begetting, to those of father and son.

And that is requisite, without which a thing *cannot endure* or continue in its being; as food and air to the life of an animal.

Or which *preserves* it in its due and natural state; as both exercise and rest, with respect to the body's health.

And the *conveniencies* or comforts of life, tho' not absolutely requisite, have an affinity to requisites, because life is, as it were, bettered by them, or rendred more tolerable and agreeable; and well being, to every thing sensible of it, is as dear and valuable as life or being itself.

That

That also is to be accounted requisite, from or by which it is adviseable and expedient *to begin*; as laying the foundation of a house, before its building or superstructure; and settling the premises of an argumentation, before drawing the conclusion or inference; and so likewise the *præcognita* of arts and sciences (as in geometry, its definitions, axioms, and postulata) are requisite to be known, before any thing is particularly taught or delivered about them; and counsel and deliberation are requisite, before going upon any difficult or hazardous enterprize; and in all cases the removal of an obstacle is requisite, before any thing can be done or attempted with success.

And

And sometimes there is a requisiteness of *occasion* or fitting opportunity, for the effecting of a design, or succeeding in business.

And a requisiteness of *circumstances* or *adjuncts*; as of time and place, which are the necessary and inseparable adjuncts of all beings, and of all actions and events; for that nothing can exist or come to pass, unless it be somewhere, and do exist or happen at some time or other.

Between some things there is a *mutual* requisiteness; as in the functions of several parts of the body, which stand in need of one another's assistance; and in general, between all things related, considered as such, for that nothing can be related to another,

other, unless that be likewise related to it, and in the same degree, or every whit as much.

And, as may generally be observed, whatever is requisite, is so far *necessary* as it is requisite, or it hath the nature of a condition *sine qua non*, as it is called, in respect of that which it is requisite to, or stands in need of it.



C H A P. III.

Of Properness.

BY *properness*, or *being proper* (according to the usual signification of the word) is here meant, a thing's being precisely such as it is, or its having a peculiar qualification, in reference to that which hath any sort or manner of dependence on it, and is therefore to be considered as the ground and reason of its dependence.

This notion doth concern and regard *principles*, *i. e.* those things from which others are derived, or do proceed and follow as consequences; and likewise things which are *useful*
and

and *convenient*, or that serve for any purpose or effect whatsoever. To begin with the first.

An *unit* or *one*, which is the principle of number, is and must be just what it is, or it can be nothing else but an *unit*, in its relation to two, three, a hundred, or any other number.

And *a rule*, or that which prescribes and directs what is to be done, or shews the way and manner of doing it (and is therefore a governing principle to proceed and act by) must be proper and apposite in these respects. Thus the rules of arithmetick, which teach the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, &c. are proper and apposite with regard to the several sorts of

calculations performed by them. And the laws or ordinances of a common-wealth, are properly framed to procure those advantages, and remedy those inconveniencies for which they were made and intended; and have likewise a *sanction* which is proper to enforce their execution, or make them obeyed; otherwise they would be insignificant and of no effect.

Also the *reason of a thing*, when made use of as a proof or argument, serves in discourse as a principle, and therefore must be proper in respect of its consequence, or that which follows from it; for supposing otherwise, 'tis manifest that the consequence drawn from it, would be wrong and false, or rather would be none. But as may be noted, any
reason

reason whatever is always in itself proper, tho' but nakedly proposed, and not used as a principle or by way of proof: as if the reason why all men love and pursue pleasure, is because it is natural so to do, or because their nature continually inclines and urges them to it; this is a proper reason, or apposite to the thing, tho' nakedly proposed, and without drawing any inference from it; for unless *proper* and apposite, 'tis plain that it would be no reason at all in the case.

As to those truths which are stiled *self-evident* and *eternal*; they are upon a two-fold account principles, and therefore proper with regard to the things which they concern. For they are the first and highest reasons of things, as being the laws and

conditions of their beings and natures: and then, which is consequent hereupon, they inform and govern our opinions and judgments, in thinking or reasoning about them.

Power likewise, and *cause*, and *essence*, are to be esteemed principles.

Every *power* is and must be precisely such as it is, in respect of its own acts and operations. For if a power were any ways different from what it is, 'tis manifest that its operations must likewise differ, or they could not be the same that they are; inasmuch as they immediately proceed from it, and have an absolute dependence on it for their being and nature. As if the faculty or power of seeing were not just what it is,
neither

neither could sight be that which it is; but might as well be hearing, feeling, understanding, spontaneous motion, nutrition, generation, or any other operation whatever. And consequently there would be no manner of difference or distinction of powers; or rather there must be but one sole power, belonging to all things indifferently, and capable of all sorts of operations, which is a plain and palpable absurdity. The not reflecting or duly considering that a power, which is proper and apposite with regard to some operations, may, for that very reason, be quite improper, or wholly unqualified in respect of others, hath occasioned great errors and mistakes in the accounts which some have given of the mind's faculties, by confounding together the operations of such as are

wholly different and distinct in their natures.

And every *cause* is precisely such as it is, in relation to its effect, or hath a power peculiarly qualified for the production of it. For supposing otherwise, any cause whatever or efficient power might be capable of producing all sorts of effects; or any effect might as well be owing to any other cause, as to that which alone produces it; which is absurd and contrary to experience.

And so likewise, the *essence* or being and nature of any thing, whereby it is that very thing which it is, and can be no other, hath a properness or peculiar qualification for the endowment of those qualities or affections which do belong to, or proceed from

from it as its consequences. For example's sake ; a triangle or any other regular figure has a form or shape which is proper in relation to its own affections ; and therefore if it were any ways different from what it is, they could not be such as they are, or they might as well belong to any other figure : but being a triangle, they must belong to it, because proper or precisely such as it is, in respect of them. And the same is most certainly true, concerning the *qualities, powers, or other affections* of any being whatever, though we do not perceive its essence, or internal form and constitution, whereon they depend, and which is the cause and reason of them, and its properness or peculiar qualification in respect to them ; as we perceive the essence of a triangle, which consists
in

in its particular form or shape: for unless it were proper or peculiarly qualified for the endowment of them, it is manifestly impossible that they should naturally belong to it, or proceed from it, as consequences of its nature and essence. Or supposing otherwise, this absurdity would follow, that the affections which are peculiar to any one being, might as well belong to any other; or any being of what kind or nature soever, might have the same affections which any other being hath, though ever so different from it: a stone, for instance, might ascend like flame, might be endued with sense, and have a power of moving itself, as well as an animal, might bear fruit like a tree, or be ductile and fusible, as gold and lead is.

To

To proceed in the next place to consider the properness of things which are *useful* and *convenient*, or that serve for any purpose or effect,

We find by experience that *water* is a proper liquid for the allaying of thirst, or hath a peculiar virtue and efficacy for this purpose. And there are *soils* and *climates* proper for the growth and production of certain fruits and plants, for they will not arrive to maturity, or thrive so well in any others. Besides which, there are innumerable instances of the like kind.

And all such *parts* as compose a regular or rational system, are proper, whether considered in relation to the whole which consists of them,

or

or in respect of one another. For instance, every animal hath organs and members which are proper, or have a certain and peculiar formation and construction, in regard to its particular nature, or with respect to the need and occasion it has for them, as it is such a species or kind of animal. Thus, the parts of a fish are properly framed and fashioned to enable it to swim and live in the water; and which would be improper for a land-animal. To instance likewise in the properness of parts, as they respect one another. The human body, which is one part of man, is proper for a rational soul, which is his other part, to dwell in; for any other kind of body, compared with it, appears improper or uncouth and unnatural. And the mouth, which takes in food, and
chews

chews it, and moistens it with its saliva, is in these respects proper with regard to the gullet which swallows it, and to the stomach which digests it.

Among parts may well enough be reckoned *ingredients*. Thus therefore he who invented gun-powder, did, no doubt, consider the several ingredients of which it consists, as proper to produce explosion. And a physician, in prescribing compounded medicines, considers the ingredients of them as proper and apposite for curing those distempers which they affect by their mixture and assemblage.

And there is a properness of *quality*, as *v. gr.* that of food or diet; for one sort of diet is proper for a
man

man in health, and another for one that is sick; and so with regard to the different constitutions of particular men, tho' they be well and ail nothing.

And a properness called *justness*, which concerns proportion and degree. Thus either food or physick must be taken in a just quantity or proportion, otherwise they will not answer the purpose. And there is a just temperament, or certain degree of heat required to keep the body in health, and in due order.

And a properness of *position* or *situation*. The head, for instance, of every animal, which contains the organs of sensation, is placed in the fore-part of the body, and the fore-legs, which differ in their make from the hind-

hind-legs, and serve to begin motion, are situated next the head.

And in general it may be said, that in all things, where *order* is to be observed, there properness takes place, as being indeed necessarily implied by it; for an order which is not proper, is really no order at all, but disorder and confusion.

As to *utensils* and *instruments* of all kinds, their properness denominates them such, or they are only so called, because proper, or appositely contrived for the several uses and purposes to which they are applied. It may suffice, to make mention only of the common instruments and tools of mechanicks, which whoever considers, will find to have a singular properness in regard

gard to the several works and operations in which they are employed. And as I may observe by the way, unless the mechanick, or he that is but a labourer, were apprised thereof, he could not use them to any purpose or effect: a plain indication, how requisite and necessary the notion, or discernment and apprehension of properness is to the exercise of the lowest and meanest employments; since, without it, a plowman could not manage his plow, nor a ditcher his spade, with any success.

And every *art* and *science* is, as I may say, by profession, proper; for it proposes and undertakes to shew a way or method of doing and performing, or discovering and knowing, what otherwise cannot be attained

tained or effected, with so much certainty and exactness. A painter, from the skill and experience he has of his art, draws those out-lines, and uses such colours as are proper for his design; as, suppose the expressing of the character of a person, by his features, complexion, looks, gestures, and the like. And a poet does in words what the other performs in sensible imagery. An orator chuses such arguments as are proper to persuade: and a mathematician makes use of those which are proper for demonstration; and which would be improper for an orator; and so would the orator's be for a mathematician's use.

The whole *mystery* of any calling, trade, or occupation whatever, does in truth, consist in nothing else,

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but in knowing those things which are proper to be done and practised in the execution and management of them, and in knowing the proper way of doing and performing them.

Nor is there any *project* or *device* of any kind used in the affairs of life, whether for the effecting of a business, or bringing about any design, whose whole virtue force and efficacy does not consist in its *properness*, with regard to the things aimed at and intended by it.

And in general, *means* of all sorts are, as such, proper; otherwise indeed they could not be called means: for, as must be supposed, they are chosen before used or applied; which if done with judgment and discretion, implies them to be proper, or peculiarly

liarily qualified for effecting and bringing about what is designed by them.

To which may be added, that there is no single *action*, nor any *thought* of the mind, nor even *word* or expression, when *pertinent* and to the purpose, but is for that reason called proper; or rather, to be pertinent and to the purpose, and to be proper, mean and intend the same thing.

And lastly, properness takes place in all *relations* whatsoever. For whatever is related, must be something which is proper for its having the relation it bears to that which it refers to; that is to say, it must be that very thing which it is, and can be no other, in respect of it. Thus, a father must be that very thing which he is, and can be no other,

in the relation he has to his son ; and the half of any thing must be precisely so much as it is, neither more nor less, with regard to the whole, of which it is a half, and so *vice versa* ; for supposing otherwise, it is manifest that these relations could not be what they are, or at all subsist.



CHAP IV.

Of Fitness.

AS every cause, or whatever produces any change or alteration in another thing, must have a power which is proper or peculiarly qualified for that purpose; so that which it acts upon and is affected by its power, must have a certain *fitness* or *aptitude*, usually called *capacity*, to receive its influence or force and impression; otherwise our reason assures us that no change or effect would follow.

Seeing that according to the different fitnesses or capacities of subjects

jects or things acted upon, the same cause may produce divers effects ; as fire by its heat melts wax, hardens clay, and reduces wood into smoke and ashes ; from hence it manifestly appears, that there is no discovering or discerning thoroughly and exactly the true nature of any effect, without knowing and apprehending the fitness or aptitude of the thing changed, for receiving the force and impression of the cause, which, by acting upon it, produces such an effect and no other. But the knowledge of the fitness or capacity of a thing for being so changed as we find it to be, does often lead us to the knowledge of such a cause as alone is proper to produce it, though we do not see its action : or if we cannot certainly discover the cause, it may however give occasion for the framing

framing of a probable hypothesis, or giving a good guess in the case.

'Tis evident that all *mechanical* and *manual operations* do proceed upon this ground and supposition, and are efficacious only for this reason, that the *matter* or *substance*, which is to be formed and modelled after such a manner, is fit and capable to be wrought upon, and to receive those impressions which are intended it should take. Otherwise, a potter might as well think of making a cup, or other utensil, of sand or of water, as of clay. Or to give an example of another kind; he that goes about to persuade another, does always suppose him capable or susceptible of the force and influence of his arguments, otherwise he would never attempt it. From which two

instances alone, 'tis easy to see, that the notion of fitness or capacity, is very extensive and important; for it concerns the success and efficacy of any action or operation whatever, with regard to the things towards which it is directed, or about which it is employed.

There is also another sort of fitness, called *expediency*, commodiousness or accommodation; which, when in act, implies the *use* or application of that which is expedient and commodious, as capacity does *reception* or admission in the subject or matter endued therewith.

Thus, *means* are expedient or fit and commodious, with respect to the ends for which they serve, or to which they are made subservient by him

him who has the conduct and management of them. And the like may be said of *instruments* of any sort, in the several works wherein they are employed, and the occasions there are for their use and service.

And *materials* of all kinds, as stone, wood, iron, wool, &c. of which utensils and manufactures, and other works are made, are fit and commodious for their respective uses and purposes. But their fitness or accommodation is different from that of bare capacity; for a rock or a tree, though capable of being made a material for building, yet is not truly so, until first hewn or cut into such forms and shapes as render it commodious for this purpose.

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And there is a fitness of *season* and *opportunity*. Thus, the night is a fit and commodious season for rest and quiet, and the day for labour and action. And the nicking of time, as we call it, hath in every one's experience a great stroke in all affairs and concernments of life, and conduces very much to the success and bringing about of any business or design; according to the saying in *Terence* on a particular occasion; *in tempore veni, quod rerum omnium est primum*: and as *Dido*, in *Virgil*, when she requests her sister to dissuade *Æneas* from leaving *Carthage*, says to her, *tu molles aditus & tempora noras*.

Between some things there is a *mutual fitness* and accommodation; as
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when two persons who love one another, do mutually accommodate themselves to the humours or tempers and inclinations of each other, whereby their love or friendship becomes strict and indissoluble. And in general, between all things that have a mutual dependence; as in the gable ends of a house, where two opposite timbers, by meeting together and leaning against one another at the top, (which is their mutual accommodation) do sustain and support each other; and in the parts of an arch, which are so fitted and accommodated to one another, that if any of them be taken away, the rest will fall and tumble down, but remaining as they are, they cause an extraordinary strength and firmness.

CHAP.

C H A P. V.

Of Dueness.

THE meaning of the word *dueness*, or being due, as here used, will be better understood from the following instances, wherein it is commonly applied, than by any definition or other explication I can give of it. I shall only, as there is occasion, take notice of the reason of its application, or shew why such a thing is said to be *due* or *owing* to another.

First then, there is a dueness of *effects* to their causes; for since every effect receives its being and existence from the cause by which it
was

was produced, it is therefore said to be due or owing to it.

And of *consequences* to their principles, as having the nature of causes; thus the conclusion of a syllogism is owing to its premisses.

And so likewise, all *properties* or essential attributes, are due and owing to the beings or things endued with them, as being consequences of their natures and essences, and having nothing that is really their own or that is not derived from them.

Also, whatever is *natural* to a thing, or by its nature it ought to have, is due to it, altho' it have it not. Thus, because a man hath naturally legs and arms, they are therefore due to his being, notwithstanding

ing he should be born without them, or by any accident should be deprived of them.

And seeing that the perfection of any thing is its most natural state, as being agreeable to the design of nature in all its productions, and what every thing naturally tends to, and would attain but for some external obstruction and impediment, as may particularly be observed in the growth and maturation of fruits and plants of all kinds, *perfection* therefore is due or owing to every thing capable of it, and as great as its nature will admit of.

Consequently, whatever renders a thing *more perfect* or excellent than it is, though it be adventitious and acquired, seems to be owing to
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it; as knowledge and virtue to the mind of man; for indeed the mind does, as it were, require and demand them, as its dues.

And *ornaments* are due to those things which receive a lustre and advantage from them, and have for that reason a sort of right and title to them.

There is likewise a *moral dueness*, called *duty*, which signifies the obligation of doing or performing what reason requires from one rational being towards another. Thus gratitude is owing from a beneficiary to his benefactor; and the performance of a promise is due to him to whom it was made; and the payment or satisfaction of a debt, from a debtor to his creditor; and worship or adoration

ration is due from every rational creature to his creator; and from children, piety towards their parents; and protection is due or owing from a prince to his subjects, and from them, obedience to their prince.

To which, for its affinity, may be joined that sort of dueness which concerns *merit* or *demerit*; as when we say that reward is due to eminent virtue, and punishment to enormous vice and wickedness.

So that this notion, among other things, signifies and points out the true nature of that relation, which effects have to their causes, and properties have to the things they belong and are attributable to; for their dueness does indeed comprehend whatever is most essential to these

these relations: and then it imports that every thing ought to have that perfection which is natural to its being, or of which it is capable, altho' it have it not; and likewise takes in the behaviour and deportment of moral agents towards one another.

I shall conclude with an observation which is very material; *viz.* *that the dueness of any thing implies a properness in that to which it refers,* as being indeed the true ground and reason of it; *ex. gr.* an effect is due to its cause, only for this reason, that its cause hath a power which is proper or peculiarly qualified for the production of it. And which instance may alone suffice the purpose; for a moment's reflection will satisfy any one, that there is no think-

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ing of the *dueness* of any thing, without referring at the same time to the *properness* of that to which it is due, and having a continual regard thereto, in considering it as due or owing to it.



CHAP.

C H A P. VI.

Of Suitableness.

THere is a *suitableness* or conformity and agreement of things discoverable by the bare use of our senses, and which requiring no reflection or exercise of reason, does not therefore fall under the present consideration. For example's sake, we no sooner compare chalk and snow together, but we find them to agree in colour; and on comparing the right and left hand, their agreement in shape and size does immediately appear to us: but which is not rational, but no more than experimental knowledge. 'Tis true indeed that to demonstrate the equali-

ty of the angles of a triangle (which is their agreement) to two right ones, we must make use of our reason; but however, equality, considered simply and in itself, is no rational notion; for there are no two things of equal magnitude, but their equality would be found out, on their being exactly measured and then compared together, which is only experimental knowledge.

That sort of suitability or conformity and agreement of one thing to another, which we here mean and intend, is, in several instances, and those the most considerable, the consequence of its due-ness; and there is always some reason or other of the suitability of one thing to another, or else it carries its own reason along with it.

Thus,

Thus, because all *effects* are due or owing to the causes or powers by which they were produced, they are therefore suitable, or agreeable and correspondent to them.

And because the *properties* of a thing are due to its essence, or do belong to it, as it is such a thing and no other, they must for that reason be suitable and conformable to it.

And so likewise all *inferences* in discourse must be suitable and agreeable to the principle or principles from which they are deduced, as being owing to them.

And every *act* or *operation* is suitable and conformable to the power

from which it proceeds, because owing to it.

And whatever is *ornamental* or becoming, is suitable and agreeable to that which it becomes and adorns; for ornaments are after a sort due to those things which appear the better and handsomer for them.

Also, whatever is *natural*, is therefore suitable; as mens appetites and inclinations; and even those passions which create trouble and anxiety, as fear and hatred and envy, because they, however proceed from their natures and tempers, or are the consequences and effects of them.

And whatever *pleases*, is suitable or congruous; not only because the
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love of pleasure is natural, but because pleasure, while it lasts, gives the soul contentment and satisfaction, which it could not do, unless suitable to it.

And there is a suitability or congruity of *actions* and *behaviour*, with regard to a man's age, condition, and circumstances, which we usually call *decency* or *decorum*.

And a suitability of *person* to a man's *character*; very fine instances whereof are to be seen in pictures, and in poems: for poets and painters are always most careful and studious to observe this decorum, as I may call it: and indeed every one is pleased with it, and thinks it natural, or agreeable to the design of nature: and the contrary, unnatural; for the

sight of an excellent man who has a deformed body or hideous features, or of one who is detestable for his base and wicked qualities, and yet is handsome and beautiful, appears very shocking and unnatural.

And a suitableness, called *uniformity*, as of the parts of a building which answer and correspond to one another; and when a man's life or actions and deportment are, as we say, all of a piece.

And there is a suitableness of *circumstances*: in which the poets do abound; and which are almost continually used in all sorts of descriptions, historical as well as poetical, and even those of ordinary occurrences. And sometimes circumstances, when nicely correspondent
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and exactly agreeable to the things or matters they refer to, are admitted as proofs in judicial proceedings.

Besides which, there are innumerable instances, which every one's experience and but a common knowledge of things will so easily suggest to him, that none of them need be mentioned.

I shall therefore conclude with observing, that *suitableness* or agreement hath frequently the virtue or power and efficacy of a *cause*. As the agreement of mens tempers and inclinations does often produce love and friendship: and harmony in musick, which is nothing else but the concord and agreement of sounds, causes great delight to the hearer: and the union or cohesion of the
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parts of bodies or material substances, is no doubt the effect, or consequence and result of their mutual agreement and correspondence, though it be secret and such as we cannot descry: and therefore some philosophers made love or friendship, by which they meant concord and agreement, to be the cause and principle of all the several systems of matter, or various sorts of beings in the universe,



CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

*Considerations on the foregoing
Notions.*

THE notion of *Requisiteness* is of use and takes place in all our *thoughts* and *reflections* whatsoever, there being nothing in *rerum natura* but is either requisite to something else, or to which some other thing is so. And without knowing before hand the requisites to any business or matter, whether of speculation or practice, 'tis mere rashness and folly to undertake it; for there must unavoidably happen perpetual blunders and mistakes, or rather there must be one continued miscarriage from the beginning to the end.

end. But the knowledge of requisites is a sure foundation to build upon; and besides does frequently point out the way or course we are to take, and is in many cases an useful hint for invention.

Properness is, as it were, the life and soul of all our other notions and cogitations, by giving them that due force and weight and right meaning and intention they ought to have with regard to the things they concern and are employed about: and without which they could be of no manner of use or service: for what would a man's thoughts and meditations signify, though ever so many and various, or fine and elaborate, unless proper, or pertinent to the purpose in hand? he might perhaps admire the pregnancy and delicacy of

of his own wit, but others would reckon it worse than dullness. And on the other hand, supposing a man acted ever so rightly and properly, without knowing it; as if, for instance, he used the best and most proper means for attaining an end, and yet did not know or discern their properness, he would in this case act like a machine. It is the distinguishing character of a wise and knowing man, to judge what is proper or most proper to be done in difficult and arduous affairs, or in nice and critical conjunctures. The highest merit of a discourse or treatise of any kind, consists in saying all that is proper, and nothing improper or impertinent. To do this in subjects that are abstruse and intricate, or very copious in matter, argues an extraordinary penetration
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and accuracy of judgment. How few authors consider the just bounds of their subject, and are careful to avoid whatever is foreign to it, or superfluous and redundant? If every thing that is not strictly proper were discarded and thrown out, abundance of huge unweildy volumes would shrink into the smallest size, and a compleat library might be furnished at a moderate expence, which now requires the purse of a prince. To know what causes or powers are proper, or peculiarly qualified to produce such and such effects and phenomena, and to discover those constitutions of bodies, or constructions of their parts which are proper and apposite with regard to the qualities and affections belonging to and proceeding from them, is the chief scope

scope and aim, and the highest attainment of natural philosophy.

Concerning the use and extent of *fitness* and *dueness*, somewhat hath already been said in speaking of them, and the little we have further to add, will presently be mentioned in its proper place.

And lastly as to *Suitableness*; there is continual occasion for its use and application in almost every thing we say or think. When in speech we *affirm* any prædicate of its subject, our meaning is, that it is suitable, or congruous and agreeable to it. And to the understanding of *proportion*, or *analogy* of any kind, this notion is absolutely necessary. Nor do we ever think of any *relation* whatever, in a rational manner, without making
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ing use of it. And to sum up all in a word; in *comparing* things together, which is necessary to be done in almost whatever we employ our thoughts about; this is our sole consideration, whether, and in what respects, they *correspond* and *agree* with one another. And there is always some useful inference to be made from their agreement, and often from their disagreement. Or tho' nothing should be inferred from thence, yet the suitableness and agreement of things, considered in their natural habitudes and respects to one another, is a very improving as well as delightful entertainment to the mind.

The *rationality* of these notions appears, from our being obliged to reflect upon, or consider and examine

amine the things they concern, before they can be applied; that is, we must consult our reason, in order to discover and understand their application: and is likewise evident from our continually using the more general word, *reasonableness*, or *reasonable*, instead of any of them, as being synonymous and equivalent: and may be illustrated by their contraries, *viz. irrequisiteness, improprieness, unfitness, undueness, and unsuitableness*; which are the very terms we commonly use, or others of a like meaning and tendency, to express our dislike and disapprobation of things, or to signify that they are shocking and offensive to our reason.

It is by means and virtue of these notions, more particularly and expressly, that we understand, or ap-

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prehend after a rational manner, all that we are capable of knowing of the natures of things, and their habits or relations to one another, which are the immediate consequences of their natures.

Requisiteness, and *properness*, comprehend whatever can be rationally known and understood of the *substances* or *essences* of things, and likewise of *causes*.

And *fitness*, *dueness*, and *suitableness*, contain all our rational discernments of *effects*; and of the *properties* or natural *affections* of things.

For, as a little reflection will satisfy any one, had we faculties whereby to perceive the internal forms and constitutions of bodies, they could exhibit

exhibit and discover to us nothing more than their *requisiteness* to the several qualities, powers, and other affections belonging to and depending on them ; and their *properness* or peculiar qualification for producing, or the having and being endued with them. And the same is likewise manifest concerning causes with relation to their effects, supposing we could perceive their most secret and hidden powers and operations.

And in knowing the *fitness* or *capacity* of a thing for receiving the influence or force and impression of the cause or power by which an effect on it is produced ; and in discovering and discerning the effect as *due* or *owing* to that cause which is *proper* or peculiarly qualified to produce it, and its *suitableness* or conformity

formity thereto; this is as much as can be known and understood of it. And so likewise, the discernment of the *dueness* of any property or affection, to the thing endowed with it, or wherein it exists; and of its *suitableness* and conformity to it, is all we can wish or desire to know of it. But without the use of these notions, 'tis evident that the knowledge of cause and effect can amount to no more but perceiving a change to happen in one thing, from the action of another upon it; which is only *experience* of *fact*, without any exercise of *reason*. And there could be no manner of knowledge or apprehension of the just relation of a property, or innate and essential affection, to the being or thing whose property it is: for to observe only its existing constantly in such a subject, without considering

the foregoing NOTIONS. 69

sidering it as due, or being attributable to it, as it is such a thing and no other; this is having no apprehension of it at all, as a property.

For a confirmation (if any be needful) of what hath been said, concerning the general usefulness and importance of the foregoing notions; I may refer and appeal to all sorts of writings and discourses, let the subjects of them be what they will. For tho' the *words*, requisite, proper, &c. or others equivalent, may not be always used or expressly mentioned, yet, which amounts to the same thing, their *significancy* or force and energy runs thro' the whole body, and every part of any discourse, and is that alone which renders it intelligible and satisfactory to any competent, or but an indifferent judge.

Or, for trial's sake, let these notions be taken away from any discourse or treatise whatever, and it will be found to be without any rational sense or meaning; and that, as to any real use or purpose for which it serves, one might as well read it backward, as forward.

THE remaining notions, which we shall now proceed upon, are *Rectitude*, *Pulchritude*, *Goodness*, *Truth*, and *Implication*. They are not, as I imagine, quite so easy, or obvious to common apprehension, as the former; nor perhaps so very clear and perspicuous in themselves, but that there may be room for different thoughts and opinions concerning them. 'Tis therefore hoped that the following account of them will meet with

the foregoing NOTIONS. 71

with the reader's favourable acceptance, tho' he should think it liable to some exceptions, or not find it in all points, exactly conformable to his own sentiments.

The three first of them do signify and denote the several sorts of *perfections*, or *virtues* and *excellencies* of things which fall under a rational consideration, or are properly cognisable by reason ; and therefore may fitly enough succeed those already exhibited and set forth, which concern their *beings* and *natures* considered in general.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Rectitude.

WE ascribe *rectitude* to a thing, or call it *right*, when it is such in every respect, as its nature, or the end for which it was designed, does require it should be: and we consider it no otherwise than as an object of the understanding, which it is delightful to contemplate, for the sake of knowledge, without having any further view or regard.

There is, for instance, a rectitude of *works* and *inventions*, mathematical and mechanical, of poems, of musical compositions, of discourses and treatises of any kind, and all other ingenious and rational performances;

ances ; importing in general, that they are wisely contrived and well executed, that they are complete or want nothing, and withal accurate and exact.

And a rectitude of *counsel*, or conduct and management, which takes place in all the affairs and concerns of life, whether of a publick or private nature ; and implies a prudent choice of means, and a skill how to direct and manage them, in all cases and occurrences, to the best advantage.

Also, a rectitude of *manners* or the moral virtues, which consists in their mediocrity, or being the middle between two extremes which are vices : as the virtue called liberality is the mean between prodigality, and avarice ;

rice ; both which are extremes and vices ; the one an excess, the other a defect.

As this last doth suppose and denote a *rectitude of the will*, which signifies a constant propensity and inclination to follow the dictates and suggestions of reason, in all our actions, desires, purposes and intentions ; so the two former imply a *right understanding*, which means not only good natural parts and abilities, but their being duely cultivated and improved by those habits of the mind, we call intellectual ; the chief whereof are science, art, and prudence ; to which whatever is scientific, artificial, and prudential, do owe their several perfections, or they derive their respective virtues and excellencies from them.

CHAP.

C H A P IX.

Of Pulchritude.

BY *pulchritude* is, in general, understood the *excellence of form*;

When exquisite and consummate, (as we here suppose it to be,) there are two qualities inseparable from it, namely, *amiableness* and *admirableness*; which together do plainly exhibit its true character, and serve to distinguish it from other perfections.

Excellence of form being in a peculiar and especial manner applicable to *beauty*, it may therefore suffice our present purpose to speak only of this, in particular.

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That beauty is *amiable* or excites our love, needs not be said: and that it is *admirable*, (I mean, when complete or absolute) must likewise be confessed, in case we make any account, (as it is but reasonable we should) of the vast praises and encomiums which the best and ablest judges constantly bestow on it, the strange and surprizing effects it has produced, and mens paying it a sort of adoration, as somewhat divine.

But unless these two qualities do meet together, they will not be *properties* of beauty, or of any other sort of pulchritude. For there are some things we admire or wonder at, and yet do not love or affect; as prodigies, and the extraordinary phenomena of nature: and there are others

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we love, without admiring ; as delightful sensations, and whatever pleases and gratifies our natural desires and appetites ; neither of which hath any affinity or resemblance to beauty. But when that which is amiable, is also admirable or raises our wonder, every one must then allow it to be beautiful ; or (as we say, more generally) *fine*, that is, excellent and charming.

There is a two-fold beauty :

One *internal* or of the *mind* ; in which, when it is perfect, and shines out in its true and full lustre, all the virtues do meet and conspire. For every particular virtue is, in itself, amiable, and deserves to be admired for its extraordinary and incomparable

ble excellency ; and therefore a complication of all the virtues is the highest pitch and exaltation of internal and mental beauty, and renders the being possessed of them, as it were glorious, or most worthy of love and admiration : and there is a harmony and correspondence of all the several virtues, connatural and congenial to each of them in respect of another ; so that when joined and united together, they mutually assist and strengthen one another, and thereby create a glory or resplendency, which is both wonderful, and charming or attractive. Accordingly, in scripture we meet with this expression, the beauty of holiness, which means a complication and concurrence of all the virtues. And *Aristotle*, in treating of justice, quotes a common proverbial saying,

saying, that justice is more *admirable*, that is, more beautiful or fair and resplendent, than the morning or evening star, because supposed to include the other virtues.

The other sort of beauty is *external*, or of the *body*; which, when it happens worthily and as it ought to do, is the *sensible image* and representation of mental beauty: and therefore, as I may take notice, but ill suits and agrees with the character of a libidinous prostitute, such as the poets make *Venus*, their Goddess of beauty, to be.

It does not wholly consist, as some have thought, in a *symmetry* of *parts*, and an agreeable colour, tho' these are proper and requisite ingredients,

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or may be reckoned as two of its constituent parts; for there may be features exactly regular and well complexioned, without imparting any spirit or sense and meaning to the face composed of them: but it consists chiefly and principally in such a *mien* and *air* as denotes any of those virtues or excellent qualities which command our affection and esteem, and makes us imagine and conclude that it is the meaning and intention of the soul, which produces such a fine and lovely mien or aspect.

That *mental*, and *corporeal beauty*, do seldom and but very rarely meet together in the same person, ought to be no rule of judging in the case. For 'tis certain that the face, which is the index of the mind, is the
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true and proper seat of beauty : and skilful painters can make looks and features that shall denote and express such or such a particular virtue ; and pourtraits of this kind are always painted beautiful ; and when rightly designed, are universally approved, and thought by every one to be very just and natural representations ; and particularly admired as the most extraordinary efforts of a painter's genius ; far beyond the expression of a vicious and extravagant passion, or any odd and fantastical humour, which shew nature, not as it is in itself, or such as it ought to be, but distorted and disguised. To which may be added, that vices are always painted ugly and deformed, with looks that create abhorrence and detestation.

Poetry, and musick, when exquisite, do, as well as beauty, charm and captivate the mind, and fill it with admiration ; and therefore may come under the general head and denomination of pulchritude.



CHAP.

C H A P. X.

Of Goodness.

WHatever is the object of a rational desire, and in the enjoyment brings along with it some real and solid benefit and advantage ; this is in general what we mean by *good*.

There are some things good in themselves, or desirable for their own sake, as knowledge, and virtue ; and others that are only so far good or desirable as they serve to obtain what is good in itself. The first are called *ends* ; the latter, *means* : but when, as often happens, we are obliged to make use of one means in order to compass and procure another, that

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for which the former is made use of, we for the time consider and regard as our end, or make it our scope and aim, until we have gained it and have it in our power, and then it is no longer our end, but afterwards serves only as a means.

Seeing there is implanted in the nature of every man a *desire of happiness*, that is, of his greatest good, or such a good as is capable of satisfying his best and utmost wishes; and since it is God who hath planted this desire in us; it is most reasonable to think that it is not in vain, but that there is a good proportionate and adequate thereto.

As to which ; it will, I conceive, upon a serious and impartial examination,

nation, appear evident, that man's *chiefeſt good and happineſs* (according to the beſt and cleareſt diſcovery our reaſon can at preſent make of it) conſidered, I mean, more ſtrictly in itſelf, and without including thoſe things that are not of its eſſence, but like appurtenances, are ſerviceable and commodious, or have their uſe and conveniency, as health, liberty, a competent ſubſiſtence, &c; man's chief-eſt good and happineſs, I ſay, thus conſidered, is really and truly nothing elſe but his *own goodneſs*, or *inherent worth* and excellency; which comprehends and implies in it all thoſe virtues which are peculiar to his rational nature, and give it the utmoſt perfection of which it is capable.

For in the first place, it is most certain that a man's proper goodness or inherent and intrinsic excellence, is *nearer* and more intimate, and therefore by far dearer to him, than any other good can be: and as a necessary consequence, it makes him truly *satisfied* and pleased with himself: and without all question, the greatest good is that which creates a perfect *self-satisfaction*, or a thorough contentment with a man's self, upon just and sufficient grounds.

Nor is there any other sort of good that can with the least shew of reason be thought to do this. For riches, and honours, and all other worldly enjoyments, are things external and transitory, and therefore are not virtues.

tues of the mind, or parts of a man's goodness, which imply a *firmness* and *stability*; and consequently cannot make a man in any measure really satisfied with himself, unless he should fancy them to be inherent in himself, and not external, which would be a madness. And particularly, as to sensual enjoyments, they cannot so much as pretend to satisfy a rational desire, or yield any the least contentment to a reasonable nature, because indeed there is no exercise at all of reason in them: and therefore should one ask, for instance, the greatest Epicure alive, whether in tasting the most delicious morsel, or making the finest repast, he has a better opinion of himself, or fancies himself the better man for it, he would no doubt laugh at the question, and think it

as foolish and absurd as the rigidest Stoick could do.

And then, with regard to the *pleasure* and *delight*, or joy and gladness of mind, which results from the practice and exercise of the several virtues, it is questionless the greatest imaginable, and as far exceeds what is sensual or external, as the faculty of reason does sense and imagination; and is as much preferable to any other enjoyment, as the conscience of good actions is a more pleasing reflection, than that of gratifying any sensual appetite. If any man thinks otherwise, it is because the objects of a rational desire do not seem to him capable of affording so much pleasure and delight, as those which gratify sense. But this, whatever any ones
private

private opinion may be, is certainly a great mistake; and the fault or defect lies only in the man, whose relish and desire of rational pleasures is in no degree fuitable and proportionate to their worthiness and excellency. For there is this plain mark of difference between them, which evidently shews which is the greater pleasure, as well as the more worthy and honest of the two. *Sensual pleasure* of any kind quickly cloyes and fatiates, and seldom or never answers expectation, and therefore the less frequent, the more affecting; according to the poet, *Voluptates commendat rarior usus*. Whereas, on the contrary, *rational pleasure* (by which I always mean the exercise of some virtue) still rises in proportion to its frequency: so that the way for a
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man to become more and more pleased with the practice and exercise of any virtue, is to practise it the oftner; for it is a certain truth, that as there is no end, of the progress and advancement that is to be made in virtue and goodness, so neither is there any of the encrease of pleasure which flows from it.

Among the *virtues*, there are two so eminent and extraordinary, that they may be well enough mentioned and considered instead of the rest; and they do indeed suppose and imply the other virtues, as accessory, or occasionally subservient to their uses; namely, *piety*, and *charity*.

The first is that duty which every man, as a rational *creature*, owes to
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his *creator*, i. e. to God, an omnipotent, eternal, infinitely knowing, wise, and good being.

The *relation* of a rational creature to his creator, is by far the nearest of all others ; because God, in endowing us with *reason*, hath not only made us what we are, which is common to every creature, but he hath made us *like himself*, whereby we are, after a sort, his children and offspring.

What therefore can be more reasonable than piety towards the author of our beings ? which consists in loving, reverencing, and adoring him ; in owning our continual dependence upon him, and thankfully acknowledging his infinite goodness
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in making us capable of understanding, in some degree, the excellency of his adorable nature and perfecti-
ons; together with all other expressions and demonstrations of the most awful sense of his divine majesty, and our utmost gratitude for the great and inestimable benefits he hath bestowed on us.

This is plainly a *natural duty*, and if duely considered, of all others the most natural: and likewise the *most indispensable*, or of the first and highest obligation; for to imagine that God should make a creature in any measure capable of knowing him, and that it should not be that creature's first and principal duty to love and honour him in proportion to his knowledge, is a most vile and senseless

less thought ; such as no one can entertain, that has not bid defiance to his reason, and abuses it to that degree, that it is become utterly unserviceable to him, in what most concerns him to know and understand, and is the very best and most excellent use he can make of it.

And what greater pleasure can there be imagined, than the continual reflection that God, who sees our hearts and thoughts, sees that they are devoted to him ? this is no doubt just matter of the highest joy and delight that any reasonable creature is capable of : and no one can imagine otherwise, who seriously considers that God, who made us, continually *upholds* us in our beings, and is always *present* to our inmost thoughts,

thoughts, and therefore cannot but regard and take notice of our behaviour towards him, and consequently when it is such as it ought to be, must be well pleased with his own creation. Nor can there be any doubt, but he will abundantly reward those who with all their heart and mind endeavour to please him, and make themselves acceptable to him.

Charity is a natural consequence of piety, never to be disjoined from it. For as God is the common father of mankind, so all men are related to one another, in the manner and quality of brotherhood. And charity is that virtue which disposes men to all acts of kindness and benevolence towards the rest of their
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own species ; such as becomes brethren or near relations one towards another.

The exercise of charity, which is *love* and *beneficence*, is questionless, in itself, a very pleasing and delightful employment : but when joined with piety, and it is done for the sake of God, the pleasure of it is mightily enhanced, and exalted to its highest pitch.

To suppose therefore the whole race of mankind, with all their hearts and minds intent on the performance of these two duties ; thoroughly devoted to the service of God, and mutually studying and endeavouring one another's good and benefit, for the sake of their creator, who made
them

them for his own glory, and that they might be helpful and assistant to one another, in whatever concerns their common welfare and happiness: this is really imagining a heaven upon earth, and such a state and degree of human perfection, as might invite angels to descend, and become the companions and associates of men.



CHAP.

C H A P. XI.

Of Truth.

I Use the word *truth*, in its most received and obvious sense; as it imports the object of a firm and undoubted assent, or whatever is worthy of such an assent.

Every truth implies in it two things; *certainty*, and a *foundation* thereof, which so soon as perceived or apprehended, makes it appear evident, and does so clearly notify it to the mind, that it may be said to authorize and command its assent to it.

Some truths are founded on *facts* or experience; and others rely upon *reason* for their certainty and evidence,

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that

that is, they are certain and evident from their exact conformity and agreement to reason ; and so may be called *rational truths*. The difference between them will plainly appear from a single instance of either. It is a truth of experience, *that few men do to others as they would be done to themselves*: it is a rational truth, *that every man ought to do to another as he would be done to himself*. Which last (supposing their certainty to be equal) is a knowledge of a far superior kind, and infinitely more agreeable and satisfactory to the mind.

Of rational truths there are two sorts : *primary*, or independent and underived ; and *derived* or consequential.

Primary rational truths (of which only we shall here speak) are by the
suppo-

supposition reasonable in themselves, or carry their own reason along with them; for otherwise 'tis plain they could not be primary.

And must therefore be *self-evident*, or appear manifest and conspicuous by their own proper and inherent light.

Of which to mention only a few. Every whole is greater than any of its parts: and every cause does precede its effect: and whatever exists hath an essence of its own, whereby it is that individual thing which it is, and can be no other: and there are certain modes of being, as finiteness infiniteness, dependency independency, and the like, which are incapable of being changed into their contraries; that is to say, whatever is finite cannot become infinite, or infinite become fi-

nite : and it is impossible for any thing to be, and not to be, at the same time : and what is past cannot be recalled, or be made not to have been. With a great many other truths of the like kind ; and a vast number besides that are less general, and *peculiar* to every *art* and *science*, or particular sort of knowledge.

They are stiled *eternal*, from their obtaining at all times alike : for it was always, or from eternity, a constant truth, that every cause must precede its effect, even before the actual existence, or operation and efficacy of any cause ; and that any two things which are equal to a third, must be equal among themselves, before ever any instance happened (or tho' there never would be an instance) of such equality.

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And *immutable*; for it were a contradiction to imagine that a truth which is eternal, and carries its own reason and evidence along with it, should be either weakened, or in the least altered from what it is, by any consideration whatever, because, by the supposition, superior and antecedent to all other considerations.

And seeing that the matters declared and expressed by primary rational truths, are no other but the eternal and immutable laws and conditions of the beings and natures of things; to which whatever exists, or can exist, is subject and conformable; they are upon this account called *principles of reason*; that is, the first and highest reasons of things.

Wherefore, all other rational truths are only *consequential* to them; because they must depend on them as principles, from which they derive their certainty and evidence; either immediately, or in a direct tho' remote consequence: for 'tis unquestionable, that whatever truth is not self-evident, or does not carry its own reason with it, can no otherwise be clearly and satisfactorily known, than by receiving light and evidence from that which is self-evident and reasonable in itself; and which must have the nature of a principle, not only with regard to that which immediately depends on and follows from it, but to all other truths which depend one upon another, tho' in ever so long a series, where none of them is evident and reasonable in itself; because otherwise

wife they would, in the whole, be weak and infirm, uncertain and precarious, as wanting a necessary support and foundation, and that clear and plain evidence which alone can thoroughly satisfy and convince the mind.

There being some occasion for the following remark, tho' in itself perhaps too trivial to deserve the mention, I shall trouble the reader with it: which is, that a *principle* of any kind ought to be expressed *generally*, and not particularly. It should not, for instance, be offered as a principle, that one and two are equal to three; but that all the parts of a whole are equal to it: for the particular follows from the general, but not *vice versa*; and every principle is what it is, only with respect to that which follows or is

derived from it. To which I shall add, that *general* truths (whatever a late celebrated author may pretend to the contrary) are *no less* clear and evident than particular ones which have any thing of reason to recommend them. For I will appeal to the judgment of any unprejudiced person, whether it be possible to apprehend, in a *rational* manner, that one and two are equal to three, (which is the instance this author uses) any otherwise than by conceiving one and two to be *parts* of three, the *whole* which consists of them. And if they must be considered as parts, 'tis certain that the clearness and evidence of the particular truth depends upon the general one, or rather is, in effect, much the same with it; there being very little difference between saying, that one and two, considered as parts, are equal to three,

three, the whole which consists of them; and that the parts of a whole are equal to it: and 'tis manifest that, without being thus considered, there could be no *rational*, but only an *experimental* knowledge of the equality of one and two to three: as if, in a measure of three inches, one should first take one inch, and then two, or twice one, (each of them separately) and afterwards compare these with the three joined together, and thereupon pronounce the one inch, and the two, to be equal to the three inches.

Now to say somewhat concerning the *way* or *manner* of the mind's coming at the knowledge of primary, or rational and self-evident truths; it is not, or may not be, the same in them all, but *different* in some from what it is in others. For before the mind
first

first discovered and was apprised of this truth, that if equals are taken from equals, the remainders will be equal, it is not improbable but that it might have observed one or more *instances* of it; and afterwards, by reflecting upon them, might conclude that it must obtain in all instances whatever. But for the finding out or apprehending of this truth, that nothing can give itself a being; or of this, that 'tis impossible for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time; it were ridiculous to think that instances, which are supposed to be facts, can be of any service or advantage; because all *facts* are, as such, *possible*, and are only to be known from experience, which does not reach or comprehend *impossibilities*. The discovery and knowledge, therefore, of these and the like truths, is solely and entirely owing to the mind's reason, which

which suggests them to it. And as ought likewise to be observed hereupon; facts, when they are *instances* of rational truths, do not however notify or declare them to the mind; but are no more than the *occasion* of discovering them, when the mind, in reflecting upon facts, endeavours, as is natural, to see whether or no they are reconcilable or consistent with reason. For if the reasonableness of any truth were to be judged of and determined by facts, it would follow that whatever is true in fact, would be reasonable; and consequently every whole, for example, would, according to reason, be greater than any of its parts, because found to be greater in all instances whatever. But this is most certainly far otherwise: for, as every one must grant, there are a great many things *true in fact*, which are
highly

highly *unreasonable*; as, v. g. vice, extravagant passion, monstrous productions, &c. and therefore nothing is or can be reasonable, because fact. So that the knowledge of the rationality of this truth, that a whole is greater than any of its parts, (or of any other) hath no manner of dependence upon facts, but is properly the immediate dictate and suggestion of reason.



C H A P.

C H A P. XII.

Of Implication.

WHEN one thing involves in it the consideration of another, as its consequence which follows directly from it, then it is said to *imply* or infer it. Or *implication* imports that if, or because, such a thing is, another must therefore be: as if there is perception, there must be an object; and because man is an animal, he must therefore be mortal: for the former of these do in the mind's judgment and apprehension *imply*, or involve and infer the latter.

To implication, which is a relative term, answers *consequence*, i. e. what is implied, as its correlative; and which
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110 IMPLICATION.

are so closely and intimately connected together, that neither of them can exist alone, or be at all conceived, and not the other at the same time.

Some things do *mutually* imply or infer one another; as cause and effect, whole and part: and others do imply *without* being implied; as action implies a power of acting; but not *vice versa*; for it is not necessary that a power should always act or be in act; and two implies one or an unit, but an unit does not imply two or any other number.

And some things which imply, are the *cause of* our *knowing* what is implied by them: as number gives us the knowledge of even or odd which are implied by it; and perception, which implies an object, is the cause of our
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knowing

knowing what any object is. But this does not hold in all instances: for tho' two implies one, yet it does not make us to know one, for this must be known before it; and tho' the motion of a body implies space or somewhere to move in, yet it does not give us the knowledge of space, or shew what it is.

Implication is either *immediate*, or *mediate*; and therefore also consequence; it being manifest that every consequence, or whatever is implied, must, in these respects, exactly agree and correspond with that which implies it.

By an *immediate implication*, I understand that which is discernable alone, or by itself, and does not stand in need of another to declare and make it known. Thus, action im-
plies

plies a power of acting; and perception, an object; and number implies either oddness or evenness; and every part implies a whole, or an entire thing of which it is a part; and convexity implies concavity: for if there is convexity, it follows immediately that there must be concavity; and if number, that it must be either odd or even; and so for the rest. And in like manner, space implies infiniteness; for in considering and reflecting upon space, we cannot suppose or imagine it to be finite, or to have any bounds and limits of its extent: and infiniteness implies immoveableness, or the infiniteness of a thing implies it to be immoveable; for it were a contradiction to imagine that what is infinite or immense, should be capable of being moved: also, the being or essence of a thing, doth immediately imply its
unity;

unity; and unity implies indivisibility; for supposing what is one to be divided, it would become two, or more than one, which is destroying its unity, and therefore contradictory. Besides which, there are of the like kind innumerable other implications, obvious enough to every one's observation, in considering and reflecting upon the natures of things, and the habitudes and conditions of their beings.

Mediate implication signifies, in general, what we call ratiocination, and is twofold, *simple* and *complex*.

The first consists of simple terms nakedly expressed, without being joined or connected together in the form of propositions, according to the manner of syllogism, which consists of them; and is, when one thing implies

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or infers another, by means and in vertue of a third; so that there are three terms employed in it, whereas in immediate implication there are but two. *Ex. gr.* blushing implies shame, and shame implies guilt; wherefore blushing implies guilt. Or to give another example, which perhaps will please better, because of a higher kind: space implies infiniteness, and infiniteness implies immoveableness; wherefore space implies immoveableness, (that is, implies its own immoveableness) tho' not immediately, yet mediately, by its infiniteness. For if one thing implies or infers another, and this another, 'tis evident that the first must imply the last, tho' not immediately, yet mediately or virtually by the second: or if there are three things, whereof the last is a consequence of the second, and the second of the first, the last

last must be a consequence of the first, tho' it do not follow from it immediately, but only by means or virtue of the second.

Here, as may be observed, immovableness is only implied, and does not imply; and space only implies, without being implied; but infiniteness is both implied, and does imply, for it is implied by space, and implies immovableness; just as when there is a first and a second cause, the effect produced by the second cause, is only an effect; and the first cause is only a cause, but the second cause is as well an effect as a cause.

All mediate *simple* implications or consequences, are founded upon such as are immediate; for otherwise 'tis impossible they should appear certain.

and evident: as if infiniteness, for instance, were not immediately implied by space, or unless it were an immediate consequence of its nature; and so likewise, if immoveableness were not an immediate consequence of infiniteness, we could not certainly infer the immoveableness of space; but these consequences being immediate, the last consequence or inference, which is mediate, *viz.* the immoveableness of space, is most true and certain, and there can be no entertaining any the least doubt about it.

Certainty however is not to be found in all sorts of consequences or inferences; which is owing to the qualities of the things from which they are deduced, as being in their natures uncertain or contingent: as, *v. gr.* when we draw inferences from the passions,
or

or tempers, and inclinations of men; which being variable and inconstant, and never so settled as to be absolutely depended upon, nothing can certainly, or any more than *probably*, be inferred from them. But supposing a thing to be in its nature constant and invariable; and supposing likewise (as ought to be done) that we perfectly well know it, as we know, for instance, the form or shape of a square or circle, 'tis hardly possible, unless thro' extreme rashness and inadvertency, that we should draw an immediate consequence or inference from it which is wrong and erroneous, or that having drawn two immediate consequences, one whereof depends upon, and directly follows from the other, we should be mistaken in the third, which is mediate.

In order therefore to form a *right* and sure judgment about any inference or consequence :

First, it will be proper and requisite to examine, whether the *subject* or matter it concerns, is necessary and immutable, or variable and contingent. In the former case, no inference is to be admitted that is not certain and indubitable ; for a probable inference drawn from what is necessary and immutable, is vain and trifling, and in no wise to be admitted. In the latter, we are not to expect certainty, but must be contented with probability ; for to think of drawing a certain inference from what is uncertain, is fond and absurd, because indeed the certainty of any inference wholly depends
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on the certainty and plain evidence of the thing from which it is taken.

As to the *degrees of probability* (which may be very different) it is to be noted, that some things are by far more variable and contingent than others: wherefore, as every one's reason will tell him, the less any thing is subject to change or contingency, the more probable will the inference be that is drawn from it. And when the perfect knowledge of a thing's nature is not attainable, much experience, or frequent and reiterated experiments, is all we have to rely upon.

In the next place it is to be considered, whether an *inference* is immediate or mediate: if *immediate*, we are to examine whether our knowledge of the thing it concerns, is cer-

tain and free from any doubt: for if so, the inference or consequence declares itself, or is self-evident, and there can be no mistake about it; but otherwise we can never be sure of its truth, or indeed whether it be a real consequence or no. If *mediate*, we are to take heed that the two preceding consequences, which are requisite to the making of it, are truly immediate; for if such, the last inference will be infallibly certain. For to repeat once more what hath been said, 'tis manifest that if infiniteness be an immediate consequence of space, and immoveableness be an immediate consequence of infiniteness, the last consequence or inference, *viz.* the immoveableness of space, is most certain and undoubtedly true.

By

By a mediate *complex* implication (so called to distinguish it from the former, which is simple, or consists of simple terms nakedly expressed) I understand that sort of ratiocination which goes by the name of *syllogism*, consisting of three propositions, whereof the two first do imply or infer the last, by means and in virtue of a term called *medium* or *argument*, employed in them both for that purpose; but so, that neither of the premises does infer the other, (as the terms, in the former, do) nor will either of them alone, or unless they be used together, infer the conclusion or last proposition.

Ex. gr.

*Every animal hath sense;
Every man is an animal; therefore
Every man hath sense.*

Here

Here the two first propositions are laid down as true and certain, or are supposed to be such, without any implication in either of them, to declare the truth of the other; and being granted, the last proposition follows or is inferred from them both, by virtue of the medium, *animal*, which is the subject in one proposition, and the attribute in the other; and whereby it is, that the conclusion is produced and inferred from them.

The reason or ground of this argumentation, commonly assigned, is that every attribute is supposed to *contain* its subject, as being the more general or comprehensive term of the two, at least, always as general: so that since sense contains or comprehends animal, and animal contains man, therefore
sense

sense must contain man: for if *A*, suppose, (which may stand for any thing) contains *B*, and *B* contains *C*, 'tis certain that *A* must contain *C*.

But this way of accounting for the truth of this argumentation, seems forced and unnatural; for there can be no doubt, (however some logicians may strain the meaning of words to serve their own purpose) but that every subject does in reality contain or include the attribute belonging to it, rather than is contained by it, let the attribute be ever so much more general: which therefore being no just or satisfactory account of the thing, I shall otherwise thus endeavour to explain it.

The nature and use of a *medium*, in this particular sort of syllogism, consists

sists in being the *proper* and *immediate subject* of an attribute which by its means is made applicable to another, of which itself is an attribute, and because it is its attribute. For instance, the medium animal (in the foregoing syllogism) is the proper and immediate subject of the attribute sense; for man hath sense, only as he is an animal: and because animal is at the same time an attribute of man; its attribute, sense, must therefore belong to, or be likewise an attribute of man: for 'tis manifest that if there is an attribute of an attribute, there must be a common subject of them both. In which way of reasoning, there is no manner of regard had to the notion of *containing*, or being contained, or one term being more general or large, and comprehensive than another; but to the nature of an attribute strictly consider'd, which
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means that it *belongs* to its subject as a property or affection; or else may be predicated of it, either as its whole essence, as in saying, man is a rational animal, (and then the attribute is the same with its definition) or as a part thereof, as in saying, man is an animal.

A particular account of syllogism (which would be too long for this place, and perhaps tedious to most readers) may be seen in the common treatises of logick; to which therefore I refer, thinking it here sufficient to have somewhat of it in general, and of that sort of it only, which hath a just preference to the rest. I shall only beg leave (because it is become a fashion of late to decry it as useless and insignificant) to assert, in its defence and justification, what cannot be denied,

nied, and was never yet disputed; *viz.* that the *figures* of syllogism, and their *modes*, do plainly exhibit, and satisfactorily make appear, all the various ways of arguing surely and rightly from true propositions; that is, drawing just conclusions or inferences from premises allowed to be true. And since, as is notorious, paralogisms or false reasonings are frequently used by some men knowingly and with a design to impose on others, and by others ignorantly and unadvisedly, even when they are most careful and cautious to avoid them; therefore to have certain rules for discovering and exposing them, and shewing what a ratiocination of any kind, consisting of propositions, ought to be, when just and unexceptionable, is no doubt a very desirable piece of knowledge, and such as cannot be too much valued. And
tho'

tho' it be true that syllogism, in form, is seldom used, and one of the propositions is, for the most part, suppressed or omitted, as being easily understood and supplied, yet sometimes it is found necessary to argue syllogistically, in the most strict and precise manner, for clearer conviction and demonstration, and that no room may be left for any cavil or subterfuge: of which it were easy to produce instances from authors who are generally held in the greatest esteem for sound and exact reasoning.

And these *two* sorts of ratiocination, or different ways and methods of reasoning, *viz. mediate simple implication*, and *syllogism*, are, I believe, all the mind has recourse to upon any occasion, or that ever occur to its notice and knowledge. For, to mention
briefly

briefly their several and respective uses and qualifications; the first, which consists of *simple terms*, discovers the reason of an attribute, property, or affection, which is no immediate consequence of the subject or thing it belongs to; namely, by finding out that which does immediately imply it, and is at the same time an immediate consequence of the subject to which they both refer. And *Syllogism* ascertains the truth of any argumentation consisting of *propositions*, by shewing, in all sorts of instances, what premises are proper to infer, and what inferences or conclusions are justly deducible from them. This last is by far of more general and common use: but however the method of implication, in which there are no propositions, is undoubtedly as natural and familiar to the mind as syllogism, which consists
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of them. For I will appeal to every one's observation and experience, whether, in order to *discover* the reason why such a property belongs to a thing of which it does not appear to be an immediate consequence, he does not always endeavour to find out that which immediately implies or infers it, and is at the same time a consequence of the subject or thing to which they both belong; and whether propositions (in which there is always an attribute predicated of its subject) are ever made use of for this purpose. 'Tis true indeed that syllogism, in proving any property to belong to a thing, must of course *shew* the reason of its belonging to it: but then the first discovery was not made by it, as will evidently appear from an instance of either ratiocination. Let the *syllogism* be this: whatever is infinite is im-

K moveable;

moveable; space is infinite; therefore space is immoveable. According to *mediate simple implication*, the ratiocination will be thus: space implies infiniteness, and infiniteness implies immoveableness; wherefore space implies immoveableness: this discovers the reason why space is immoveable, *viz.* because it implies infiniteness, which implies immoveableness: the other makes use of it, by way of proof or argument, as a thing already known and found out. A great deal more might be said on this head; but I believe thus much, if duly considered, will appear sufficient.

There being frequently occasion in syllogistical ratiocination, (which takes place in all discourses that require strict and exact reasoning) to have recourse to those truths which are called *principles*,

ciples, that is, primary or independent, and underived truths; and continual occasion for the use of *general* or *universal propositions*, it will not here be amiss to shew, that the knowledge and discovery of them is owing to implication.

As to the first, 'tis certain that every *primary* or independent *truth* is implied by' the nature, or quality, and condition of the thing which it concerns. Thus, the nature of a cause, which means the production of an effect, that is, of something which derives its being from it, doth imply this truth, that it must precede its effect. And the nature of a whole, which consists in being constituted and made up of parts, (two at the least) implies that it must be greater than any of its parts. And the quality, or nature,

and condition of any thing considered as having an actual existence, implies an utter impossibility that it should not be while it is, or that it should exist and not exist at the same time. Nor is there any other way of discovering these and the like truths; for the mind cannot make them, or any truth whatever: nor do they arise in it spontaneously, or of their own accord; but the knowledge or apprehension of them requires reflection and consideration; and consequently they must be implied by, or inferred from the natures of the things they concern.

Implication is likewise the only sure way and method whereby to come at the knowledge of *general* or *universal propositions*, such I mean as are rational, or founded in the reason and natures of things: and for the doing
whereof,

whereof, any single or particular instance will suffice: as thus; let it be supposed that this particular thing, which is a cause, is considered by the mind as having the nature of a cause; and that consequently it must, according to reason, precede its own proper effect. This consideration, I say, does most certainly imply and infer that every other cause must precede its own effect; because there is no instance whatever of any other particular cause, but may as well be concluded from the like consideration, to precede its own particular effect; and consequently, as was said, any single instance suffices to make this general proposition, that every cause must precede its effect. And so likewise, if this particular triangle, considered merely as a triangle, *i. e.* a figure comprehended by three strait lines, (no matter what the pro-

portion of its sides is to one another, or how much its angles differ from those of other triangles) hath its angles equal to two right ones; this implies or infers that every triangle must have the same property belonging to it: for 'tis manifest, that if it belongs to this particular triangle, as it is a triangle, and for no other reason than because a triangle, it must belong to every triangle considered in the same manner. Now, as I may observe, an universal proposition made from an *induction* of particulars, is seldom or never so certain, but there remains some doubt whether the induction be full and perfect: but there can be no such scruple about an universal proposition, according to this method of implication; and then, an induction of particulars, tho' supposed ever so perfect, hath not that force and exertion of reason to recommend

mend it, and therefore cannot be so satisfactory to the mind, or carry that weight and authority with it, which the other does.

To what hath been said, I shall only add the following observations, which will appear to be of moment.

1st Observ. *The extent of implication is universal; there being nothing imaginable but what either implies, or is implied by something else.*

To exemplify which, with regard to the general *natures* and *habitudes* of things, it may suffice to instance in those more comprehensive notions of *essence* and *property*, *cause* and *effect*, *whole* and *part*. There is no *property* belonging to any thing, but is implied by its *essence*, or may be inferred from

it, either immediately or mediately : for unless inferrible from it, there could be no rational evidence or assurance that it is its property, or that it might not as well belong to some other thing. Nor is there any *cause* that does not imply its own proper *effect*, so soon as its power for producing it is known, and likewise the *capacity* or *fitness* of the thing whereon it acts, for receiving and admitting the force and efficacy of its power. And every *whole* implies the several *parts* of which it consists, supposing, I mean, that it is a regular system and design, which requires such and such parts, and a certain number of them.

Implications of a different kind from these, are *signs*, which do, by the supposition, imply or infer the things whereof they are signs. They are either

ther *natural*, as blushing, which implies shame ; paleness and trembling, which denote fear ; and any look, or gesture, or tone of the voice, proceeding from passion or some emotion of the mind ; and a multitude of others that might be mentioned : or *arbitrary*, which are *words*, or any other marks, employed to signify the meaning and intention of him that uses them. Of words some are *proper*, which serve to express the just and precise ideas of things ; and others *figurative*, which commonly signify more, and are used to raise the idea and imagination of a thing above its ordinary conception ; and are therefore, as I may call them, *vehement* implications.

There are also, as may be noted, implications peculiar to that sort of fancy and ingenuity which goes by the
name

name of *wit*. And I am apt to believe that most of those sayings or speeches we call witty, (at least, the best and most notable of them) are nothing else but *fine implications*, which are uncommon and unexpected, and do for that reason cause a delightful surprize. And therefore such of them do most affect and strike us, as are used by way of *retortion*, and made to signify the contrary of what was intended by a former implication, because then the less expected. As when the governor of a *Roman* province thought to daunt an orator, who with great boldness and vehemence of speech accused him, and very justly, of rapine and extortion, by saying to him, What makes you bark? The orator replied, Because I see a thief: which was turning against him his own implication, and repaying it with a vengeance.

And

And there are, besides, innumerable other implications, expressed by the words, *intimation*, *hint*, *allusion*, and the like, continually used in all discourses and conversations, whether serious or diverting; and which have that infinite variety of turns arising perpetually from new and unforeseen circumstances and incidents, that I much question whether they can be reduced under any certain heads. And as I may add (if it be not too trivial a remark) it is by a *chain of implications*, one depending upon another, and the former still introducing, or giving rise and occasion to that which next succeeds it, that *conversation* is upheld and kept alive; and which, otherwise, would grow heavy and languid, and must quickly expire and die away in silence.

2d Observ.

2d Observ. *Whatever is not knowable alone or by itself, can no otherwise be known, than by means of some thing which implies it, or from which it may be inferred; and which is so manifest at first sight, that to mention it is sufficient. Wherefore all sorts of inventions (which deserves a particular notice) must be owing to the things which implied them, to him who had wit and sagacity enough to discover their implications.*

3d Observ. *Implication is the instrument of rational knowledge, or the proper way and means of acquiring it. For to know the reason of a thing, and to have a rational knowledge of it, signify alike: and the reason of a thing does always imply or infer it; nor is there any other use or end of it, but*
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to infer that by it, which could not otherwise be known and understood. Or to the same purpose and effect we may say, rational knowledge of any kind necessarily requires the use and exercise of *judgment*, which always supposes some ground or reason for its being such as it is. And 'tis most certain, that the *reason* of our judging as we do, in any case or instance whatsoever, is nothing else but that which implies or infers the thing to be so as we judge it to be.

4th and last Observ. (and which follows from the rest) *Implication is the test and criterion of mens parts and abilities.* An extraordinary capacity for discovering and finding out the implications of things, is that sort of sagacity and ingenuity which serves for *invention*, the most vigorous, and
active,

active, and strenuous (if not the most excellent) of the mind's intellectual powers; and the most delightful, for nothing is so pleasant as invention, or gives a man, and with just reason, so good a liking and opinion of himself. And we shall always find, that proportionably as any one is more or less ready and acute in discerning the various sorts or different shapes and turns of implications, he hath a greater or less share of wit and understanding; or is more quick, or slow of apprehension. And he that is wholly incapable of discerning any implication whatever, can have no pretence to sense or meaning of any kind, in the lowest degree, but ought to be deemed quite stupid, or a mere idiot who is destitute of all understanding.

C H A P.

C H A P. XIII.

The Conclusion.

TO take, in the last place, a summary view of the several *uses* of rational notions, in order to draw a proper and just inference from the whole.

It is by the notions of *requisiteness*, *properness*, *fitness*, *dueness*, and *suitableness*, that we are enabled rightly to understand, or apprehend in a satisfactory manner, the *natures of things*, and their various *habitudes* and *relations*: and which are so general and extensive as to be applicable, some or other of them, to whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking.

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The three succeeding notions do signify and denote the several *perfections*, or *virtues* and *excellencies* of things properly cognisable by reason :

For *rectitude* is that perfection which pleases the *understanding*; the knowledge of it being desirable for its own sake, and including whatever is most worthy of being known and understood, considered only as knowable or intelligible.

Pulchritude delights that faculty (call it either a rational imagination, or, if you had rather, *reason* itself) which is affected by the excellency of form, or what hath a fine and lovely aspect or appearance.

And

And *goodness* gratifies the *will*, whose proper object is good, or what is beneficial and advantageous.

Truth (the notion which follows next) comprehends the *principles of reason*, that is, the eternal and immutable laws and conditions of the beings and natures of things.

And lastly, *implication* is the *instrument of rational knowledge*, or the proper way and means of acquiring it.

Whether these notions (as we have endeavoured to explain them) do, together, form a complete system, or are all that the mind makes use of in the exercise of its reason, is more than I shall presume to determine. But if, as I can hardly doubt, they are the

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chief

chief and principal, those of lesser moment may the better be dispensed with, and more easily supplied. And they will however, as a specimen, serve to justify the following inference or conclusion; *viz. that by rational notions, the mind is sufficiently qualified and enabled to know and understand, in the most satisfactory manner, whatever is possible to be known or understood.* For so far only as any thing appears to be reasonable or conformable to reason, does it afford a knowledge which the mind can thoroughly acquiesce and rest satisfied in: and a higher or more perfect satisfaction than this, cannot be desired or wished for. Nor is there any other way of knowing or apprehending what is reasonable, in any case or instance whatever, but by the use of rational notions; for to know the reasonableness of any thing,

thing, that is, to apprehend in what respect, or upon what account it is reasonable, and to have a rational notion of it, signify alike. And seeing that these notions, which are the proper acts and operations, or the immediate dictates and suggestions of reason, are applicable to every thing, or to any object whatever of thought, (which is saying, that every thing may be satisfactorily known and understood by them) *the cause therefore of our ignorance of some things, which we can never hope thoroughly to know and understand, is not any defect or incapacity of our reason, but the want of fitting means and opportunity to make use of it.* Thus, for instance, 'tis impossible for us to know with any certainty and exactness, how, or after what manner, the several properties and powers of corporeal substances do sub-

fiſt, and are ſuch as we find them to be; becauſe our ſenſes are not acute enough to diſcern the internal forms and conſtitutions of bodies, whereon they depend, and whereby they are produced: which is as much as to ſay, we want the proper and requiſite means to underſtand them rightly. But had we ſuch faculties, there is no doubt but they might appear as intelligible to us, as the powers and forces of any artificial machine of which we know the contrivance and mechanifm; and our knowledge of them, to the full as certain and exact. So that, as muſt be allowed, the mind's capacity for knowledge cannot be called in queſtion.

'Tis true indeed, that human reaſon is ſlow, and weak, and fallible: but then, it grows more ready and expedite

pedite in its operations, and continually gathers new force and strength, by assiduous and constant exercise and employment: nor is there any thing so difficult to be understood, but, if at all knowable, its difficulty may be mastered and overcome, in length of time, by dint of study and meditation. And tho' our reason be fallible, or apt to err and mistake, we ought not to think that it is so, essentially, or in itself considered as a faculty of knowing and judging of things; but that it happens to fall into errors and mistakes, either thro' prejudice, or for want of a strict examination, and due consideration of the matters under its inspection; which are the true and only causes of its judging wrongly. And we might as well find fault with our sense of seeing, when it is disorder'd by intemperance, or when we do not

take time enough to survey an object, which cannot be thoroughly and distinctly discerned at a single view, or if perused in a cursory and careless manner. 'Tis also to be considered, that reason, the same faculty which commits errors, is capable of discovering them; and does frequently, and upon a thousand occasions, rectify the mistakes it has been guilty of; which is, so far, making reparation and amends for its failures and miscarriages.

SINCE the agreement of things to reason, hath no manner of dependence on *our* notions or conceptions of them; for whatever is agreeable to reason, was always or *eternally* reasonable, whether apprehended by us or not. And therefore neither human reason, nor the reason

son of all the angels of heaven, can make any thing to be reasonable; because it was *so in itself*, before ever it was considered or thought of by them. Seeing also that the *reasonableness* of every thing does necessarily imply and refer to *reason*, as that which it must agree and correspond with; so that unless there were reason, nothing could be said to be reasonable. But by *this* reason, (continually referred and appealed to upon all occasions) no one ever means his own reason, or the reason of the wisest man, or that of an angel, but *reason considered absolutely and in itself*; and accordingly the word reason is used in this manner continually. And forasmuch as a great many things, which are no doubt agreeable to reason, do exceed the reach and comprehension of any *finite reason* or understanding whatever:

Does it not therefore follow from hence, that there is such a thing *as reason itself*; that is, *absolute, eternal, and infinite reason*? And is not this reason the cause of whatever is reasonable, or that which constitutes the reasonableness of every thing, *since without it nothing could be reasonable*? and from which the reason of man, or any other finite intelligence, *derives its being and nature*; and is *only a ray or particle of it*?



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The Proof of a G O D.

P R O P. I.

That there is a Self-existent Being.

BEFORE we go to demonstrate this proposition, it will not be amiss to explain the notions of *Self-existence*, and *Cause of being*, in the sense wherein we intend to use them.

Self-existence, or a thing's being *merely* and *absolutely of itself*, signifies existing by a virtue or power which is originally and inherently its own, without any sort or manner of derivation

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tion or dependence. And because this kind of existence plainly requires, and can only belong to, a nature which is *simply* and *absolutely necessary*; and consequently, what is of itself must necessarily exist, or cannot but be; *self-existence*, and *necessary existence*, may therefore be used as equivalent terms, indifferently one for the other; and a *Self-existent Being* properly enough be defined, that which exists by the absolute necessity of its *own nature*.

By a *Cause of Being* is meant, that which brings a thing into being which before had no being at all: and which is the true and proper notion of *creation*; and distinguishes it from those *causes* we call *natural*, which tho' they change and alter the beings, or frames and constitutions of things already existing, from what they were originally,
yet

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yet do not bring any thing into being which before had none at all, and therefore are not really and truly the causes of being in any thing. So that to have a cause of being, and to be created, are expressions that signify alike.

Now if we suppose, that there is any thing *without a cause of its being*, 'tis most certain and undeniable that it must be *of itself*, and can only exist by the necessity of its nature: for necessary existence, or absolute necessity of nature, is evidently so much the sole and undoubted *property* of a being which is without a cause, that it cannot possibly be denied of it, nor be ascribed to any other, without a manifest contradiction: and indeed the very notion of self-existence or necessary existence, is built upon the
supposition

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supposition of a thing's being without a cause, and is inseparable from it.

And on the other hand, supposing any thing *to have had a cause of its being*, 'tis unquestionably certain that it could not receive its being from, *i. e.* be created by, that which had a cause of its own being, *i. e.* from another creature. For creation, or the bringing a thing into being which before had none, or was once nothing, is undoubtedly the proper act of an almighty or infinite power; and, as must be granted, infinite power is an incommunicable attribute or perfection. Besides, if a power of creating could be communicated, then, the being on which it is conferred, having the same power, might endue a creature of its own with such a power; and this creature might make another such creature;

creature ; and so on, *in infinitum*, which is so shocking an absurdity, that no one can bear the thought or imagination of it. Everything therefore which had a cause of its being, must owe it to that which is without a cause, *i. e.* (as hath been shewn) to that which is of itself, or exists by the absolute necessity of its own nature.

So that, whether we suppose any thing to have had a cause of its being, or to be without a cause, (and either the one, or the other, is always a necessary and indispensable condition of every thing's existence) 'tis manifest that something must be of itself, or there must be a *Self-existent Being*.

2

PRO P.

P R O P. II.

*That a Being which is not self-existent,
was created by that which exists
of itself.*

SINCE nothing can give itself an existence, or be the cause of its own being; for admitting it could, it must have a power of acting before it is; that is, in other words, it must exist when it is not: and it being likewise a contradiction to imagine that any thing can arise merely or absolutely out of nothing; for in this case *nothing*, or what has no manner of existence, and consequently no power or capacity of any kind, must be supposed capable of producing or bringing forth a real and positive being, or something which actually is; it undeniably

niably follows hereupon, that a being which is not of itself, or does not exist necessarily, must have had an external cause of its existence; that is to say, (according to what was declared in the precedent PROP.) it must have been *created* by that which is *without a cause*, and consequently exists of itself.

P R O P. III.

*That a self-existent Being can have
but one sort of nature :*

*And that it must be precisely, in all re-
spects, that very thing which it is.*

I. **T**HE necessity of a being or nature which is without a cause, is questionless the greatest that is possible or imaginable; such indeed as may very justly be stiled the *supreme*

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or

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or *highest necessity*; as being originally and essentially inherent; most pure and simple; and truly absolute, or without any condition, restriction, or limitation, as having no manner of dependence on, or relation to any thing: all which is peculiar to it, and can be said of no other kind of necessity.

Now pure, absolute, or simple and unconditional *necessity* of *nature*, is most undoubtedly always *one* and the *same*, and does not admit of any manner of difference or variety. Wherefore the *nature* of a Self-existent Being, which is simply and absolutely necessary, can be no other than that which it is, or it must be of *one sort only*.

Besides; the admitting of a possibility of any difference in the nature of
a Self-

a Self-existent Being from that which it actually is, or of its having any other sort of nature but that which it hath; this is, in effect, supposing and allowing what is most absurd and contradictory; *viz.* that there may be *several* and *various kinds* of self-existence, or different ways and manners of a thing's existing necessarily and without a cause; for 'tis manifest that if the nature of a Self-existent Being were different from what it is, the necessity of its existence could not be the same that it is, and consequently it must have a way or manner of existing different from that which it hath: which is as much as to say, there may be more ways than one of a thing's existing of itself, or necessarily and without a cause.

2. Also, whatever is of itself, or exists necessarily, must, after the most precise and determinate manner that is possible or imaginable, be, in *all respects* whatsoever, that very thing which it is, in its so existing, or in its act, as I may call it, of self-existing; every whit as determinately, as ten is ten, which cannot by any stretch of fancy be imagined to be nine, or eleven, or any other number: for, as every one must grant, a necessity of nature which is truly absolute, or perfectly irrespective and unconditional, does most certainly imply and infer thus much,

PROP.

P R O P. IV.

That there is but one Self-existent Being.

'TIS at first sight manifestly impossible that there should be any manner of necessity for the existence of *several* beings, of the very *same* nature, (as by the last they must be) which are of themselves and without a cause; there being no other imaginable ground or reason for any number whatever of beings which are absolutely of themselves and without a cause, but their having *different* natures; for in this case indeed, there would be an equal necessity for their all existing, as much for any one, as for another; but otherwise, most cer-

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tainly, none. Now whatever is not necessary, absolutely so, in all cases and matters which concern self-existence, or a self-existent being and nature, is in no wise to be admitted, but should be rejected and disallowed, not only as groundless and impertinent, but as dissonant and incongruous, and utterly incompatible with the nature of the thing.

Or to the same purpose, more fully and explicitly, thus. Let us suppose any *certain* number of self-existent beings, as, *v. gr.* twenty. Since each of them is without any cause whatever, and consequently they are all entirely independent of one another, and of every thing else in the whole universe; 'tis manifest there is nothing, either within themselves, or from without, which could determine or ascertain
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 their

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their number to be just twenty, and neither more nor less. Now to suppose or imagine a certain, or fixed and determinate number of things, for which 'tis utterly impossible there should be any manner of cause or reason, is evidently a most gross and palpable absurdity.

And on the other hand, it were a contradiction to suppose that any number of things, whose existence is absolutely necessary, should be *undeterminate*, or *inconstant* and *uncertain*, or indeed that their number should not be as determinate, and as necessarily what it is, as their several or particular natures and existences are necessary and determinate; unless we suppose a *continual encrease* of beings which exist necessarily and without a

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cause,

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cause, without any stop or end; which is monstrously absurd.

Now, as must be granted, there is no imagining any number of things of any sort or kind whatsoever, without supposing it to be either determinate, or indeterminate, either fixed and certain, or inconstant and uncertain; or there is no number whatever of things, (whether actually or only potentially existing) but must of necessity be either the one, or the other. Which plainly evinces and demonstrates, that self-existence, or a Self-existent Being, is necessarily and by its nature, perfectly *singular*, or one only; for that it does not admit (as all other things do and must) of a supposition of any number, either determinate or undeterminate, certain or uncertain.

I

PROP.

P R O P. V.

That the Self-existent Being is eternal.

THERE is undoubtedly the very same reason for the existence of a being which is without a cause, at any one time, as at another; for it could not bring itself into being, and by the supposition, it is entirely independent of every thing. The present existence therefore of a being which is without a cause, does necessarily imply that it always was, and will be to eternity.

Otherwise thus. A being whose existence is absolutely necessary, cannot without a contradiction be supposed, at any time whatever not to be; because

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because absolutely necessary existence is by its nature continual and indefectible, or must always and at all times, equally obtain and take place; and consequently there never was or could be, nor ever will or can be, any time of its not existing.

P R O P. VI.

That the Self-existent Being is immutable.

SINCE whatever is of itself and without a cause, can no otherwise possibly exist than by the necessity of its own nature; and seeing this necessity is *most pure* and *absolute*, and consequently incapable of any difference or variety, and likewise *eternal*; nothing therefore is more unquestionably

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bly certain and evident, than the absolute *immutability* of a Self-existent being, or the eternal and most perfect constancy and unchangeableness of its nature. To gainsay or dispute this, would in effect be saying, that a thing which is necessarily such as it is, may however change its nature, and become different from what it is, whilst it continues to be necessarily such; which is a contradiction in terms.

Or one may argue otherwise, thus: The nature of that which exists of itself, being absolutely or in itself necessary, 'tis manifest that no change or alteration can happen in it, but from something external; and which must be either self-existent, or not. It cannot suffer any change from the former, because there is but one such being, which is itself: nor from the latter, because

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because whatever being is not self-existent, must (by the 2d PROP.) be a creature of that which exists of itself.

Or further, thus: Let us, for argument's sake, suppose what is most extravagantly absurd, *viz.* two self-existent beings of *contrary* natures to one another. Since absolute necessity of nature does not admit of *degrees*, for 'tis impossible that it should be greater or stronger than it is, and consequently it must be the same in them both, or cannot be greater in one than the other; 'tis manifest that neither of them could have any advantage of strength, or force, and power over the other: so that, let their conflict, from the contrariety and opposition of their natures, be imagined ever so sharp and fierce, each of them must eternally remain an equal match for the other; and

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and it would be the same thing in effect, as if there were only one such being in the world, which having no other that could cope or contend with it, must therefore continue always unalterably the very same that it is in itself, without a possibility of suffering the least change from any thing.

Now as to the *attributes* or *affecti-
ons* of the Self-existent Being; 'tis most certain that whatever they are, or how many soever, they must be all *essential properties* of its nature. For, as hath already been declared, (PROP. 3.) whatever is of itself, or exists by the necessity of its own nature, must after the most precise and determinate manner that is possible or imaginable, be in all respects whatsoever that very thing which it is, in its so existing; every whit as determinately as any number is
just

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just what it is, or a square or circle is that very figure which it is: wherefore the Self-existent Being can have no affection whatever, that does not belong to it, merely, or purely, and solely, as it is self-existent: which is as much as to say, every affection belonging to it must be an essential property of its nature.

Consequently, it is impossible that it should either *acquire* any new property or affection, or *lose* any that it hath already: for it were a contradiction to suppose what is essential to a thing, to be wanting to it; as it must be, if ever it had it not, or at any time loses it.

Wherefore also its affections and attributes must be just *so many* as they are,

are, and can be neither more nor fewer.

And exactly the *very same* that they are, without a possibility of being any other.

And *eternal*; because co-existent with its nature and essence, which is eternal.

And lastly, *incapable of intension or remission*; that is, of any variation in degree: for the encrease of any quality, virtue, or power, in its degree, argues that it wanted time to arrive to its full, or due and just perfection; and a decrease or diminution implies an inability to hold out and continue always in the same tenor, or with the same force and vigor: both which are alike incompatible with a nature which
is

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is eternally and most necessarily the very same in all respects whatsoever. Besides, agreeably to what was declared, (PROP. 3.) all the affections of a Self-existent Being must be every whit as much, and in as strict and rigorous a sense, essential properties, as the affections of numbers, or geometrical figures, are essential properties of their natures; and these, as is well known, are utterly incapable of any the least intension or remission.

'Tis manifest therefore, that the Self-existent Being is *absolutely*, and *in all respects* whatever, *immutable*.

P R O P.

P R O P. VII.

*That a Being which is mutable in
any respect, was created by that
which is self-existent.*

IT was demonstrated, (PROP. 2.) that
a Being which is not self-existent,
was created by that which exists of
itself.

And from the last, which proved
the absolute immutability of a Self-ex-
istent Being, it follows that what is
mutable in any respect, cannot be of
itself.

Whatever Being, therefore, is mu-
table in any respect, must have been
created by that which is self-existent.

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P R O P.

P R O P. VIII.

*That the world was created by
the Self-existent Being.*

THERE is not any the least doubt or question, but that every *body*, or *material system*, is capable of being new-formed and modified in such a manner, as to acquire several properties or qualities which it had not before, and to lose others which it once had. Nay, even the *human Soul*, tho' incorporeal, is subject and liable to several sorts of changes and alterations: for it is apt to be disconcerted, and put out of its natural frame and temper, by its *passions*, which it cannot remove, nor get rid of their power and influence: and its *intellectual faculties*

culties are capable of continual improvement; and its *moral endowments* of becoming every day better or worse than they were; and every *habit*, whether moral or intellectual, tho' grown by degrees to be ever so strong and permanent, took its rise from a weak and unstable disposition. And our reason assures us that every other *finite intelligence*, as well as man, is capable of becoming still more perfect and excellent than at any time it is, by making a further progress and advancement in *knowledge*, of which there is no end; and likewise in *virtue* or *goodness*, which is never at a stand; and in general, by continually aspiring and growing up to higher degrees of *perfection* of every sort and kind.

So that *every being* in the whole world or universe, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is, in some respect or other, *mutable*, or subject to change and alteration: and consequently (by the last) must have been created by the Self-existent Being.

To which may be added, that the great variety of beings every where to be seen, many of which are wholly different in their kinds and natures; and their vast and even infinite number, are two other demonstrable evidences of their not being self-existent, and therefore of their being created: for, by the 3^d PROP. a Self-existent Being can have but one sort of nature; and by the 4th, there can be but one such Being.

Creation,

Creation, I know, is thought by some to be altogether *impossible*. But I will ask any one who is of this opinion, whether he is not perfectly well assured within himself, that he is not self-existent. 'Tis certain that he either is already, or may be so, upon a moment's reflection, because *not conscious* of his own self-existence: for every man is conscious, or hath an undoubted knowledge and perception of his own existence: and that a man should be self-existent, and yet not conscious of his self-existence, or of his existing necessarily and without a cause, as he is of his bare existence, is not conceiveable or imaginable. And if he is not self-existent, I ask, by what other way or means he could come into being, than by creation? That, if not self-existent, he must have been

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created, was demonstrated, PROP. 2. Besides, nothing is absolutely and in itself impossible to be done or effected, but what implies a contradiction; as suppose, the causing a thing to exist, and not to exist, at the same time. But there is no contradiction in supposing a power capable of causing a thing to exist which before had no existence, or bringing that into being which once had no being: for who can pretend to know the utmost extent of power, or will take upon him to set bounds to the power of a being which is of itself and without a cause, and consequently the first and supreme cause, when there are innumerable productions and operations of natural, or second and subordinate causes, far above our reach and comprehension? All therefore that can be said against creation, amounts to no more than this, that

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that it signifies such an *excess* of power as we are not able to conceive or apprehend: but it cannot be thought more wonderful or hard to be conceived than self-existence, or a thing's being absolutely of itself and without a cause; for which however there is the most plain and demonstrative proof.

As to *Aristotle's* notion, that the world was an emanation from the Divine Being, (and which, as may probably be conjectured, he grounded upon the supposed impossibility of creation) it hath not the least pretence or appearance of reason to countenance and support it, nor hath he offered any for this his strange and singular opinion. There are a great many unanswerable objections to which it is liable; but I shall here mention only

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one, *viz.* that it is highly absurd to imagine that any thing that is subject to change and alteration, as the whole world and every part of it is, should be an emanation from a being which is absolutely and in all respects whatever immutable. For an emanation of any kind, or whatever proceeds from or out of a thing, tho' it should be of a different nature from it, (but which, perhaps, ought by no means to be granted) yet most certainly it cannot be of a nature directly opposite and contrary to it; and there can hardly be imagined any two things more opposite to one another, than a proneness and liableness to change, and a perfect, or inherent, and essential immutability. Whereas there is no absurdity in thinking that any created being, tho' ever so perfect and excellent, should be mutable and subject to

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to change; nay, it is reasonable to think it should, and highly unreasonable to imagine otherwise; for indeed *mutability* is a plain signature, as I may call it, which can never be defaced, or one indelible mark and character of a *creature*.

Now to say somewhat concerning *space*, because it is every where invariably the same, and likewise infinite, and eternal; and therefore some have fancied it to be wholly independent of every thing. Either it is self-existent, or not; either created, or uncreated. Space is not self-existent, because no substance; for it were most absurd to imagine that any thing but substance, which by its nature is necessarily before all other things, should be absolutely of itself and without a cause, and consequently independent
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of every thing for its being and existence: wherefore to suppose space to be self-existent, and yet not a substance, is indeed supposing it to be a self-existent nothing, which is nonsense. Nor is it created, because substance alone, properly speaking, is capable of creation; and besides, being infinite and eternal and perfectly invariable, it cannot be a creature. Now since space is neither self-existent, nor created, because no substance, it remains that it must be a natural effect and product, or consequence and result of a being or substance which is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. I shall only add, that the opinion or conceit of some, that space is nothing at all, is a wild and extravagant notion: for *nothing* hath no manner of existence, which we are sure, from continual experience, space has; and
confe-

consequently can have no capacity of any kind: but we cannot help conceiving space to be the receptacle of all bodies, and that wherein they must necessarily exist, and move; which are plainly capacities, and therefore cannot, without a manifest contradiction, be ascribed to nothing; *i. e.* to what hath no sort or manner of capacity. Or to the same purpose, one may say thus: If space is nothing, and therefore hath no existence, there could be no such thing, as *here*, or *there*; for here, and there, are certainly affections of something: and consequently, a body, in moving, could not move any where; that is, could not move at all; or it would move, and not move, at the same time.

P R O P.

P R O P. IX.

That the Self-existent Being is omnipotent, infinite, omnipresent, and a spirit or incorporeal substance.

I. **S**INCE in creation there is no precedent matter to work or act upon, nor any thing like a means or instrument that can possibly be employed therein; 'tis evident that creation, tho' it infinitely surpasses, in virtue and efficacy, all other operations, is wholly *exempt* from any the least *pains* or *labour*.

And there being no medium between entity and non-entity, creation therefore is *instantaneous*, or without any gradual process.

Seeing

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Seeing also there is an infinite distance between nothing, or what has no sort or manner of existence, and that which hath an actual, or real and positive being; there is therefore as much power required to create the least, as the greatest thing; a mite, or grain of sand, for instance, as a world; and consequently no more power is required to create the greatest, than the least thing: and it being likewise, in the nature of the thing, impossible that a power of creating should, in any respect whatever, be stinted or confined in its actings; 'tis therefore as feasible to create millions of beings or worlds, as one only.

And forasmuch as every creature is continually preserved and upheld in its being by the same power which
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made it, that therefore which creates, can likewise annihilate; for it is but withdrawing its conserving power from the creature, and it must instantly vanish and return to its primitive nothing.

'Tis also unquestionably certain, that a creator can give his creatures what forms or essences he pleases, or whatever are possible or imaginable, with the same ease that he brings any thing into being; and that he can at any time afterwards change and vary their natures, or alter the frames and constitutions of their beings, after innumerable ways and manners; and can likewise move and dispose and manage them in all sorts of directions: for all these acts, or ways and manners of acting, and whatsoever there may possibly be besides, are most evidently

dently the immediate consequences of a power of creating, or are virtually contained and comprehended in it, as a lesser power is included in a greater.

From which it appears, that a creator, *i. e.* the Self-existent Being, is *omnipotent*, or hath a power of doing all things, in an instant, and most easily, or without any the least pains or difficulty.

2. And it being utterly impossible, in the nature of the thing, that any bounds or limits should be set to a power of creating, or that there should be a certain and determinate sphere of its acting which it cannot transgress, or beyond which it cannot proceed and act, the creator therefore, whose power is necessarily unlimited and unconfined, must be an *infinite* or *im-*
2 *mense*

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menſe Being; for immenſity is plainly a neceſſary and immediate conſequence of omnipotence, or a power of creating, which, by the very ſuppoſition, is boundleſs, and not to be confined within any limits how large or extenſive ſoever.

3. And his immenſity is *omnipreſence*, or a perfect fulneſs of being, without any inanity or vacuity; becauſe if his power extends to every where, he likewiſe muſt be every where. And which follows likewiſe from hence, that there is no part of ſpace but is as free as another, for his creatures to exiſt and move in; and whereſoever they are, or can be, he muſt be, becauſe they could not continue a moment in their beings unleſs he were immediately preſent to them, as having no power of their own of
exiſting

existing and being what they are, but what is immediately derived from and does continually depend on their creator.

4. And the Self-existent Being, who is the creator of all things, must be a *spirit*, that is, an incorporeal or immaterial substance: for if he were a body or material substance, he would be excluded by all other bodies from being where they are, because matter cannot penetrate matter, or one body cannot be at the same time where another body is; which contradicts his omnipresence.

Besides; *body* or *matter*, unless considered merely with regard to the uses and purposes for which it serves, (and which are innumerable, as appears from the infinite variety of material

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beings in the world, none of which wants its use) is indeed a vile and abject thing of no manner of value or account. Now it were most absurd to think, and is indeed a very shocking imagination, that the substance or essence of that being who is the first cause, and consequently the last end of all things, and therefore utterly incapable of being employed or made serviceable to any use or purpose, should be of the same kind and nature with that which is *only useful*, or whose whole virtue, worth, and merit consists merely in its serviceableness or fitness, and accommodation to some end and purpose. And which, as I may observe by the way, does plainly denote and imply body or matter to be a creature.

P R O P.

P R O P. X.

That the Self-existent Being is absolutely perfect; and consequently is omniscient, all-wise, infinitely good, and infinitely happy.

THERE is no imaginable *perfection*, tho' ever so excellent in its kind, or tho' infinite in its degree, but what is possible, or may be supposed to have a real existence, provided there be a *subject* capable and fit for the reception and endowment of it. Now the Self-existent Being is undoubtedly *capable* of all imaginable or possible perfections; because self-existence, or absolute necessity of nature, is in order the first and primary per-

O 2 fection;

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fection; and does so immediately, and after so peculiar a manner concern and affect, and, as I may say, qualify the being or essence of that to which it belongs, that it may to all intents and purposes be well enough considered as the same with it: and consequently self-existence, or the self-existent nature is the root and spring of all perfections whatsoever; or it is that perfection upon which all others, that either are or can be, must necessarily depend, as their principle and first cause, and from which of course they must proceed and be derived, as their true and only source and original.

The Self-existent Being, therefore, must be endowed with all sorts of perfections; such, I mean, as are worthy of and suitable to a nature which is necessarily the first and highest, and consequently

frequently the best and most excellent. For to imagine it capable of any perfection which it has not, is most absurd; because in a being which is of itself and without a cause, and consequently eternal, 'tis utterly impossible there should be a capacity for any endowment, without its actually having it, *posse* & *esse*, in whatever is eternal being the same thing.

And seeing that *self-existence* or being without a cause, is a way or manner of existing, infinitely more noble and excellent than *derived existence* or that which hath a cause; for there is not indeed a greater difference or distance between what is infinite, and what is finite of any kind, than there is between these two sorts of existence, it being beyond the power and reach of omnipotence itself, to make any

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thing of equal dignity and excellence with that which is of itself and without a cause.

It follows therefore, hereupon, that the Self-existent Being must be *absolutely* or *infinitely perfect*; or it must be endued with all possible and imaginable perfections in an infinite degree.

And from which may be deduced this corollary or inference; that the transcendent and superlative excellence of self-existence above derived existence, or the infinite distance, in point of dignity and excellency, between a being which is of itself and without a cause, and that which hath a cause, is the true ground and reason, or, as I may call it, the differential cause, of the necessarily infinite perfection of the one,

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one, and the necessarily finite perfection of the other.

Consequently, the Self-existent Being must be *omniscient, all-wise, infinitely good, and infinitely happy.*

That *knowledge, wisdom, goodness, and happiness*, are perfections, or things desirable in themselves, and most worthy of the highest regard and esteem, is so evident a truth that it stands in need of no proof, or rather does not admit of any. One might as well use arguments to demonstrate and make appear that *ignorance, folly, pravity, and misery*, are imperfections, or things to be hated and disesteemed: nay, if the others are not perfections and excellencies, there can be no reason to think these to be imperfections,

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or things odious and undesirable, as every one is sensible they are.

Knowledge, wisdom, goodness, and happiness, are the perfections of an intellectual nature, which consists of *understanding* and *will*, which are faculties or powers that must necessarily be ascribed to the Self-existent Being, unless we suppose him less perfect than ourselves, who are not self-existent. Their meaning is generally so well understood, that there can be no need to define or explain them particularly. I shall therefore only observe, (as an inference from what hath already been said) that since they are undoubtedly perfections of the most excellent kind, it follows that they must necessarily belong to the Self-existent Being, as *essential properties* of its nature, and must likewise be *infinite* in their *degree*.

gree. Concerning their infiniteness I shall only add a word or two, because otherwise demonstrable than from what went before: and it will suffice to speak only of infinite *knowledge* and *understanding*, the infiniteness of the other perfections being concluded by it.

Let us then suppose, for argument's sake, a man who had attained the age of a thousand years, without any decay or impairment of his faculties, and during that time endeavoured to acquire as much knowledge as he could, and who had all fitting means and opportunities to inform himself of whatever is knowable. There is no manner of doubt but he would be vastly more knowing, and likewise more apprehensive and intelligent, (for increase of knowledge quickens
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and improves the intellectual faculties) than if he had lived only the ordinary age of a man. Wherefore, by parity of reason, the knowledge and understanding of an *eternal* being must be infinite.

We must not however imagine that the Self-existent Being did, by thinking or meditating from eternity, improve in his understanding, or grow more knowing than he always was: but we are to conceive, that his knowledge and understanding were from all eternity the same, because there is no duration that is short of eternity, but is infinitely short of it, as much the longest finite duration, as the shortest. Wherefore, as was said, his knowledge and understanding were eternally the very same that they now are and ever will


will be ; that is, infinite, or so full and perfect as to be incapable of any the least addition or improvement.

Now the Being or Essence, whose attributes and perfections are, *Self-existence* (the fountain and original of the rest) *Oneness of Nature*, *Singularity*, *Eternity*, *Unchangeableness*, *Omnipotence*, *Immensity*, *Omnipresence*, *Spirituality*, *Infinite Knowledge*, *Wisdom*, *Goodness*, and *Happiness*, with all other possible perfections ; this is that most excellent and glorious, supreme and sovereign, ever to be adored and magnified *Being*, we call *G O D* ; to which, in every language, there is a *name* appropriate of the like force and importance ; among all nations and people held *sacred* and *holy* ; and
never

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never invoked or pronounced, (not at least by any sober and confiderate person) but with the *greatest honour, dread, and reverence.*

F I N I S.



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never invoked or pronounced, (not
at least by any false and confident
person) but with the greatest
awe, and reverence.

H I M S